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MAKING IT UP AS THEY GO ALONG: THE
ROLE OF LAW IN SECURITIES ARBITRATION
Barbara Black* and Jill L Gross**
INTRODUCTION
Because of the Supreme Court's 1987 opinion in
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon' validating pre-dispute
arbitration agreements ("PDAAs") in customers' brokerage
account contracts, most customer disputes2 are resolved in
arbitration in a dispute resolution forum sponsored by a securities
self-regulatory organization ("SRO").3 Self-described as speedy
and inexpensive alternatives to litigation,4 these SRO forums-
principally NASD Dispute Resolution ("NASD-DR")5 and the
* Barbara Black is Professor of Law at Pace University School of Law and Founder
and Co-Director of its Securities Arbitration Clinic.
** Jill I. Gross is Visiting Professor of Law at Pace University School of Law and Co-
Director, along with Professor Black, of its Securities Arbitration Clinic.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the staff of NASD Dispute
Resolution, Inc., members of PIABA (Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association) and
the general counsel's office of the SIA (Securities Industry Association) in preparing this
article. The genesis of this article is a comment regarding the irrelevance of the law made
by an arbitrator during a hearing of one of the clinic's securities arbitrations.
1 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
2 See GEN. ACCT. OFF., REP. No. GGD-00-115, SECURITIES ARBITRATION:
ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS PROBLEM OF UNPAID AWARDS 30 (2000) [hereinafter
2000 GAO REPORT]. It is sometimes asserted that investors can choose to do business
with a broker-dealer firm that does not require an agreement to resolve disputes through
arbitration as a condition of opening an account. In the authors' experience, such firms
are exceedingly rare. The U.S. General Accounting Office ("GAO") found, since its 1992
report, an increase in the number of broker-dealers that required PDAAs even to open
retail cash accounts. See id. Nine broker-dealer firms that responded to its survey
reported that they required individual investors to agree to resolve their disputes through
SRO-sponsored arbitration as a condition of opening most types of accounts. See id.
3 SROs are defined in Section 3(a)(26) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("SEA"), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (1994), and include the national securities exchanges and
the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD"), the largest SRO.
4 NASD Dispute Resolution: What is Dispute Resolution?, available at
http://www.nasdadr.com/whatdr.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2002) (touting arbitration as a
benefit to parties because it provides a "prompt, inexpensive alternative ... to litigation in
the courts").
5 See Press Release, NASD Dispute Resolution, NASD Launches New Dispute
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New York Stock Exchange Arbitration Department-have
become virtually the only playing fields for resolving customers'
disputes with their brokers.6 Administrators of these forums
idealize a system where arbitrators are freed from cumbersome
procedural and legal requirements and arrive at fair and just
resolutions accepted as final by the parties.7  In fact, as a
consequence of the McMahon decision, the arbitration process has
come to resemble litigation more closely in terms of its procedures
and attendant delays.'
Little attention has been paid to the issue of whether, as a
result of McMahon, arbitrators, in fact, do apply the law to decide
disputes. While the Supreme Court assumed that arbitrators could
and did apply the law, there is now considerable evidence that they
do not. SRO arbitrators receive virtually no training on the
complex law governing customer-broker disputes, have no
obligation to justify their decisions with sound legal reasoning, and
their awards are subject to judicial review on the merits only for
"manifest disregard" of the law. Additionally, their awards do not
serve as precedent-future arbitration panels cannot rely on
previous awards as a source of authority. Indeed, in recent years it
has become evident that there are areas where the "law is clear,"
but arbitrators are regularly arriving at results that appear contrary
to the law.'
The privatization of the law through securities arbitration
since 1987 has serious implications for the orderly and systematic
development of the law resolving customer disputes.", While
development of the law has not yet, at least, been "frozen," courts
Resolution Subsidiary (July 17, 2000), available at http://www.nasdadr.com /news/pr2000/
nesection00_160.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2002). In July 2000, the NASD spun off as a
subsidiary company the NASD Regulation Office of Dispute Resolution to administer
NASD alternative dispute resolution services, including arbitration and mediation. See id.
The new company was re-named NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. ("NASD-DR"). See id.
NASD-DR also administers dispute resolution for the American Stock Exchange, the
Philadelphia Stock Exchange and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. See id.
6 See 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 23. The American Arbitration
Association's ("AAA") securities caseload declined significantly after 1990. See id. The
GAO found 121 securities-related disputes between investors and broker-dealers at five
federal district courts; in only fifteen cases did the courts decide the dispute. Seventy
percent of the 121 cases were dismissed. See id. at 7.
7 See, e.g., Robert S. Clemente & Karen Kupersmith, Pillars of Civilization: Attorneys
and Arbitration, 4 FORDHAM FIN. SEC. & TAX L. F. 77, 79-80 (1999).
8 The increasingly litigious nature of securities arbitration was a principal concern of
the Ruder Report. See sources cited infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 312-23 and accompanying text.
10 See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999) for an interesting discussion of the
privatization of law through arbitration.
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MAKING IT UP AS THEY GO ALONG
have few opportunities to generate relevant precedent." Judicial
and administrative opinions generated by the enforcement
functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
and the SROs-although they do address standards governing
broker-dealer conduct 2 -do not address the legal issues that are
frequently the most contested in private suits: whether the
relationship between the customer and broker is fiduciary or
contractual; 3 the investor's obligation to use diligence (often
phrased as "justifiable reliance"); 4 and how to measure the
investor's damages.15 Moreover, at a time when the industry is
dramatically changing-e.g., sizable increase in the number of
retail traders and the volume of retail trading, proliferation of
discount brokers, increased volatility in the trading markets, new
products, new methods of trading (online) bringing in new
customers with different expectations-there are few occasions for
the courts to address the issues in dispute among today's
customers and brokers. Consequently, the small number of post-
1987 precedents assume a disproportionate importance given their
scarcity.1
These limits on the arbitrators' ability to apply the law raise
the question as to whether-despite the Supreme Court's
assurances in its McMahon decision'7 that investors could vindicate
their statutory rights in arbitration-investors are treated fairly in
arbitration. At the time of the McMahon decision, there was
widespread consensus that arbitration was harsh for investors and
investors' rights would get lost in the process of removing
customer disputes to SRO arbitration."
1 See infra notes 143-69 and accompanying text. Exceptions generating judicial
opinions include decisions on motions to vacate an arbitration award, class actions, and
the extraordinary situation where the parties do not invoke the PDAA. See id.
12 See, e.g., SEC v. First Jersey Securities Inc., 101 F.3d 1450 (2d Cir. 1996) (boiler
room operations; excessive markups); SEC v. Sayegh, 906 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(stock manipulation); In the Matter of Joseph Barbato, 69 SEC Docket 169 (Feb. 10, 1999)
(material misrepresentations and omissions, unsuitable recommendations and churning).
13 See infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
16 See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
18 The following statement by Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion in
McMahon, epitomizes this view: "[tjhe Court thus approves the abandonment of the
judiciary's role in the resolution of claims under the Exchange Act and leaves such claims
to the arbitral forum of the securities industry at a time when the industry's abuses toward
investors are more apparent than ever." Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220,243 (1987).
Investors' advocates urged Congress to enact legislation to overturn the result. See,
e.g., McMahon Decision Should be Overturned to Protect Investors, House Panel Told, 20
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 492 (Mar. 31, 1988). Massachusetts adopted regulations to
2002]
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Current perceptions about the fairness of these arbitrations
vary dramatically. Regulators and attorneys affiliated with the
securities industry extol, in particular, the virtues of an efficient
and inexpensive alternative to litigation by knowledgeable
arbitrators.'9 In contrast, many attorneys who represent investors
object to arbitration because of suspicions about the independence
of the SRO forums 0 and a belief that arbitration reduces investors'
substantive rights.2' Finally, the perception of some is that
arbitration is simply a "total crapshoot. ' 22
Congressional concerns about fairness occasioned two studies
by the U.S. General Accounting Office ("GAO") in the past
decade. In a 1992 report, the GAO reported no findings of a pro-
industry bias, but recommended improvements to arbitrator
selection and training to provide investors assurance that the
prohibit brokers from insisting on a PDAA as a condition of opening an account, but the
SIA was successful in striking them down on preemption grounds. See Securities Indus.
Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989).
McMahon, however, had many supporters other than the securities industry, many
viewing it as necessary to alleviate congestion in the courts, particularly in the aftermath of
the October 1987 market crash and the anticipated increase in the number of investors'
complaints. See Connolly, 883 F.2d at 1116, for an expression of these views.
19 See, e.g., SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION ("SICA"), What
is Arbitration?, in ARBITRATION PROCEDURES § 2, available at http://www.sec.gov
/investor/pubs/arbit2.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2002) ("dispute... resolved by impartial
persons who are knowledgeable in the areas of controversy," and "a prompt and
inexpensive means of resolving complicated issues"); Letter from Paul J. Dubow,
Chairman of the Arbitration Subcomm. of the Litigation Comm. of the SIA, to Jonathan
G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 23, 1997), available at
http://www.sia.com/1997_commentletters/html/sec97-25.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2002)
("It is widely accepted that arbitration provides both claimants and defendants with an
efficient, expedient, lower-cost alternative to litigation.").
20 See Seth Lipner, Ideas Whose Time Has Come. The Single Arbitrator and Reasoned
Awards, SECURITIES ARBITRATION 2000, at 659, 661 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice
Course, Handbook Series No. 659, 2000).
21 Whether investors have a right to recover punitive damages has been the issue that
the sides have fought over most vociferously. The firms' efforts to enforce PDAAs,
culminating in the 1987 McMahon decision (discussed infra notes 27-40 and accompanying
text) is largely explainable by the fact that, until recently, New York law (the choice of law
in many broker-dealer agreements) did not permit arbitrators to award punitive damages.
See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354 (1976). In Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995), however, the Supreme Court ruled that a general
choice of law provision did not provide clear notice to investors that they were giving up a
right to claim punitive damages. While the New York Court of Appeals has not yet
overruled Garrity, most Appellate Division cases have abandoned the Garrity rule and
have allowed for the award of punitive damages. See, e.g., Americorp Sec., Inc. v. Sager,
239 A.D.2d 115 (1st Dep't 1997). Amicable resolution of the punitive damages issue has
not yet been achieved. The Ruder Report recommended a cap on punitive damages, and
a proposed NASD rule sought to implement this recommendation, but the rule has not
been adopted.
22 Julie Rawe, Broker Poker, TIME, June 25, 2001, at Y15 (quoting Deborah Bortner,
Washington State's chief securities regulator).
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arbitrators were fair and competent.3 Subsequently, a 2000 report
stated there was no basis to make any conclusions about the
fairness of SRO arbitration proceedings. 24 The GAO noted that
investors did not receive as high a percentage of favorable
arbitration awards during any year from 1992 through 1998 as they
had during the previously surveyed period of January 1989
through June 1990, and that the percentage of the amounts
claimed that was awarded also declined during this period.
However, the Report also noted that the increase in the
percentage of cases settled during the latter period may have
changed the mix of cases advancing to final award. Moreover,
the GAO stated that it could not assess the fairness of SRO
arbitration by comparing it to other forums, because the caseloads
at an independent forum (AAA) and at the courts were too
small. 6
What is the current role of the law in securities arbitration?
Given the difficulties investors would encounter in pleading and
proving their claims in court, they may well be better off in a
system where less attention is paid to the law and more to the
equities of the actual dispute before the arbitration panel. While
this is not a system where accountability and predictability of
results can be achieved, investors may, in fact, fare better than
they might expect. It follows then that if equitable considerations
enhance rather than subtract from investors' chances of recovery,
then investors need not worry about the consequences of the
arbitrators' failure to apply the law.
I. Do ARBITRATORS HAVE TO APPLY THE LAW?: MCMAHON
In its 1987 opinion, Shearson/American Express Inc. v.
McMahon,27  the Supreme Court overturned long-standing
precedent and held that PDAAs were legally binding, despite
section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act ("SEA") invalidating
"any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to
waive compliance" with any provision of the statute. 8 Section
23 GEN. Acr. OFF., REP. No. GGD-92-74, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: How
INVESTORS FARE 6-9 (1992).
24 See 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
23 See id. at 23-25.
26 See id. at 5.
27 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
28 McMahon's holding technically applied only to SEA claims. Two years later, the
Court, as expected, extended its holding to claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933.
See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
2002]
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29(a), in the view of the Court, prohibits waiver of the statute's
substantive obligations 9 and has no applicability to section 27,
which confers exclusive jurisdiction for violations of the SEA and
its rules on federal courts. The Court explained its 1953 decision
in Wilko v. Swan, 0 in which it reached the opposite conclusion in
interpreting similar language in the Securities Act ("SA"), as
based on its previous judgment that arbitration was inadequate to
enforce the substantive rights created by the statute. The Wilko
Court specifically noted aspects of the arbitration process that may
lessen the Act's substantive protections: arbitration proceedings
were not suited for cases requiring "subjective findings on the
purpose and knowledge of an alleged violator"; arbitrators must
make legal determinations "without judicial instruction on the
law"; an arbitration award "may be made without explanation of
[the arbitrator's] reasons and without a complete record of their
proceedings"; the "power to vacate an [arbitration] award is
limited," and "interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in
contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts,
to judicial review for error in interpretation."'"
Thirty-six years later, the Court looked at the current
arbitration process and concluded that it now provided an
adequate means of enforcing the statutory provisions.32 The Court
noted that it more recently had recognized, in opinions enforcing
arbitration clauses in other areas of the law,3 that arbitral tribunals
can handle factual and legal complexities without judicial
instruction and supervision and that the streamlined procedures
did not curtail the claimant's substantive rights.34 Thus, in rejecting
McMahon's contention that the arbitration process could not fairly
vindicate his federal statutory rights, the Court stated that "[b]y
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."35
29 Therefore, a provision in the customer's agreement explicitly stating that federal
securities law would not be applicable in resolving disputes between the customer and the
broker would violate this provision.
30 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
31 Id. at 435-37.
32 The McMahon Court characterized the Wilko Court's concerns as "reflect[ing] a
general suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and the competence of arbitral
tribunals," a view not specifically related to federal securities claims and no longer
adhered to by the Court. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 231.
33 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985) (upholding the arbitrability of federal antitrust claims).
34 See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 229-30.
35 Id. (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628). The Court frequently has repeated this
very phrase to endorse arbitration of other federal statutory claims. See, e.g., Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (ADEA claims); Rodriguez de
[Vol. 23:3
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In support of this conclusion, the Court observed: "there is no
reason to assume at the outset that arbitrators will not follow the
law; although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is
limited, such review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply
with the requirements of the statute. 3 6 The Supreme Court had
flipped: in Wilko the lack of meaningful judicial review (other than
for "manifest disregard" of the law37) supported its view that
arbitration could not preserve investors' rights under the law,
whereas in McMahon the limited amount of judicial review
ensured that investors could be protected.
Crucial to the Supreme Court's opinion was the assumption
that arbitrators must and do apply the law, at least with respect to
federal statutory claims.38  However, this assumption loses some
force when considered in the context of the state law rule, that, at
least in some states, unless the parties agree otherwise, arbitrators
are not bound by the law and need not apply substantive principles
of law when deciding disputes. Rather, these states acknowledge
that an arbitrator "may do justice as he sees it, applying his own
sense of law and equity to the facts as he finds them to be and
making an award reflecting the spirit rather than the letter of the
agreement [to arbitrate]... . -39
The Court's views on arbitration had changed from distrust to
acceptance of the process. Moreover, in the specific area of
securities arbitration, the Court pointed to changes in the SEC's
regulatory authority since Wilko to ensure the adequacy of the
SROs' arbitration procedures." One explanation is that the
Justices believed that the characteristics (principally, speed and
informality) that previously made arbitration deficient because it
was not the functional equivalent of a judicial proceeding had
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,483-84 (1989) (SA claims).
36 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232.
37 See infra notes 262-64 and accompanying text.
38 In fact, this assumption has been widely challenged since the McMahon opinion.
See, e.g., Ware, supra note 10, at 71.9-25; John F.X. Peloso & Stuart M. Sarnoff, Whether
Arbitrators Have a Duty to Apply the Law, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 18, 1996, at 3.
39 Silverman v. Cooper, 61 N.Y.2d 299, 308 (1984); accord Moncharsh v. Heily & Bias6,
832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992); Schnurmacher Holding, Inc. v. Noriega, 542 So.2d 1327, 1328
(Fla. 1989). This may explain why at least one firm has added language to its PDAA
expressly requiring arbitrators to "resolve the dispute in accordance with applicable law."
PDAA, New Account Form, Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. (on file with
authors).
40 See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233-35. For example, the Court noted that, in 1975,
Congress amended the SEA to allow the Commission to reject any proposed SRO rule
change if not consistent with the objectives of the statute. See id. at 233 (citing 15 U.S.C. §
78s(b)(2) (1994)). The Court added: "[e]ven if Wilko's assumptions regarding arbitration
were valid at the time Wilko was decided, most certainly they do not hold true today ......
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become virtues that made arbitration an attractive alternative. If
this explanation is true, we would expect subsequent regulatory
developments to focus on enhancing the virtues of the process yet
ensuring that arbitrators apply the law. In fact, this is not what has
happened. Instead, the regulatory approach has been to make the
arbitration process more closely resemble a judicial proceeding
and to ignore the issue of the application of the substantive law."
The following section tracks the evolution of the arbitration
process, through amendments to the pertinent securities
arbitration codes of procedure, from an informal proceeding into a
quasi-judicial one. Subsequently, the authors examine the
practical difficulties arbitrators encounter in their efforts to apply
the law.
II. ARBITRATION PROCEDURES BECOME
MORE LIKE LITIGATION
A. Arbitration Procedures at the Time of McMahon
In 1977, the SEC asserted a need for a nationwide investor
dispute resolution system to resolve expeditiously small claims; it
noted that investors with large claims apparently found litigation a
feasible method of seeking redress.42 As a result the Securities
Industry Conference on Arbitration ("SICA")43 was organized,
consisting of representatives of the SROs, the public, and the
Securities Industry Association ("SIA")."4 SICA first developed a
Uniform Code of Arbitration that the SROs adopted in 1979-
1980.11 While each SRO must approve changes in its procedural
rules and submit the changes to the SEC for approval, and while
the SROs have not always adopted all the SICA proposals, until
41 There have been other changes in the SRO arbitration process that seek to alleviate
investor distrust of the process, such as the procedure for allowing parties to select their
arbitrators. While the composition and selection of arbitrators raise interesting legal
issues, they are not addressed in this Article except to make the point that they also
contribute to the increasing delays in the arbitration process.
42 See Implementation of an Investor Dispute Resolution System, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-13470, 12 SEC Docket 186 (Apr. 26,1977).
43 See Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA: The First Twenty Years, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
483,488-90 (1996) (setting forth the background on the creation of SICA).
44 See About SIA, Securities Industry Association Website, available at
http://www.sia.comabout-sia/index.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2002). The SIA is the
principal trade organization of securities firms in the United States and Canada, and
counts more than seven hundred firms as members. See id.
45 See In re NASD, Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-16860,20 SEC Docket 233 (May 30, 1980).
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very recently the NYSE and NASD versions of the Uniform Code
remained generally the same.
Immediately prior to McMahon, the arbitration procedures in
effect at the NASD "6 were very informal." The provisions on
discovery were aspirational: "prior to the first hearing session, the
parties shall cooperate in the voluntary exchange of such
documents and information as will serve to expedite the
arbitration." 8  Moreover, the Code instructed that "the parties
shall produce witnesses and present proofs to the fullest extent
possible without resort to the issuance of the subpoena process," 9
although the arbitrators and any counsel of record had the power
of the subpoena process as provided by applicable law. 0 The only
provisions relating to the hearing set forth what was not required:
arbitrators were not bound by rules of evidence governing the
admissibility of evidence,5' and no record of the proceeding was
required, unless requested by the arbitrators or a party. 2
B. SEC Staff Recommendations after McMahon
Soon after McMahon, SEC staff sent a list of recommended
changes to the arbitration procedures to SICA.5 3 In the exchange
between the SEC staff and SICA culminating in changes in the
SRO arbitration rules approved by the SEC, the competing visions
46 This section focuses on the arbitration procedures at the dispute resolution arm of
the NASD (now known as NASD-DR), because it is the SRO forum where most
investors' claims are heard. NASD-DR reports that it handles more than 90 percent of all
securities-related disputes through its dispute resolution services. See Press Release,
NASD-DR, NASD Dispute Resolution To Provide Arbitration Awards Online (May 10,
2001), available at http://www.nasdadr.com/news/pr2001l/nesectionOl_019.html (last
visited Mar. 31, 2002).
47 See Deborah Masucci & Edward W. Morris, Jr., Securities Arbitration at Self-
Regulatory Organizations: Administration and Procedure, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION
1988, at 309, 399 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 601, 1988).
The NASD's Code of Arbitration Procedure in effect in July 1987 is set forth as Exhibit
24. See id. at 399. Part III governs customers' disputes with broker-dealers. See id. at 406.
48 NAT'L Assoc. OF SECURITIES DEALERS, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE §
32(b), in NASD MANUAL (CCH) (1987) [hereinafter NASD CODE 1987].
49 Id. § 32(a).
50 See id.
51 See id. § 34.
52 See id. § 37.
53 Letter from Richard G. Ketchum, Director of Division of Market Regulation, SEC,
to SICA members, in Mark D. Fitterman, Catherine McGuire, & Robert A. Love, SEC
Initiatives for Changes in SRO Arbitration Rules, SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1988, at 257,
279 app. A (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 601, 1988). In
addition to those discussed in the text, many of the recommendations related to expanding
the pool of arbitrators who are not affiliated with the securities industry and other issues
relating to arbitrator selection and qualification.
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of securities arbitration are delineated. The SEC staff
contemplated a process that was more judicial than the SICA (and
SRO) vision: not only would arbitration involve a hearing where
the parties would present evidence obtained through a discovery
process, but also the arbitrators would apply the law to arrive at a
decision. The SEC, moreover, assumed that arbitration would not
become the exclusive forum for resolution of investors'
complaints."
Specifically, the SEC staff recommended that:
* Discovery procedures should be expanded to resolve
discovery disputes prior to the hearing;"
* Pre-hearing and preliminary conferences should be
held in complex cases;56
* Arbitrators should be trained in the relevant state and
securities law;57
* A record of the proceedings should be preserved for
judicial review of awards, using what the SEC staff
referred to as the "developing 'manifest disregard'
standard;"5
* Arbitrators should include in the awards a summary of
legal issues resolved in a dispute and to indicate
whether the arbitrators concur or dissent from the
award;59
* Awards should be made publicly available, so that
investors can check the track record of arbitrators and
the public can evaluate the system;6"
* Special guidelines for administration of large and
complex cases are needed, and parties could ask for
opinions, so that a body of precedent could be
created.6'
C. SICA's Response
In its response,62 SICA expressed its vision of the post-
McMahon arbitration process. It agreed with the need for a
54 See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
55 See Fitterman et al., supra note 53 at 287.
56 See id.
57 See id. at 282.
58 Id. at 286.
51 See id.
60 See id.
61 See id. at 290.
62 See id. at 293 (letter set forth as Appendix B).
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discovery rule, a pre-hearing conference in large and complex
cases, and preservation of a record.63  With respect to other
recommendations, it showed less enthusiasm. SICA
acknowledged generally the importance of training arbitrators, but
did not directly address the SEC staff's recommendations that
arbitrators receive instruction in the law.'
With respect to awards, SICA believed that the Commission's
concerns could be addressed by maintaining a list of cases, the
general subject matter of each case, the amount of the claim and
award, the names of the arbitrators and a notation if the claim was
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. This list would delete the
names of parties and would only be available to parties in pending
cases and their counsel.65 SICA pointed out, however, that this
information "will serve little utility and may mislead parties
regarding an arbitrator's track record.166 Indeed, SICA suggested
that it was "not reasonable to conclude that awards written in the
manner [SEC staff] suggest could capture the decision making
process of a panel." 67
With respect to the recommendation for written opinions in
large cases, SICA was blunt: "any rule which purports to require
written opinions.., could very well hinder, rather than enhance,
the administration of arbitration proceedings. '68 It expressed
concern that this would decrease the willingness of arbitrators to
participate, and might interfere with parties' expectations that
arbitration proceedings were confidential.
D. Post-McMahon Arbitration Procedures
In 1989, the SEC approved significant changes in SRO rules,6'
but made it clear that it continued to have concerns about the
process. It implied that its views on the fairness of arbitration
might change if it became, de facto, the exclusive forum for
63 See id. at 298-99.
64 The letter merely commented, in response to a specific suggestion of a periodic
newsletter about developments in arbitration, that this should be left to the discretion of
the individual SROs. See id. at 296.
65 See id. at 298.
66 Id. at 299.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 303.
69 See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by
the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and
the American Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use of
Predispute Arbitration Clauses, Exchange Act Release 34-26805, 54 Fed. Reg. 21144 (May
10, 1989).
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investors.7" It signaled that it awaited further changes, noting that
SICA was still considering its recommendations regarding the
training of arbitrators, the evaluation of arbitrators' performance,
and additional procedures for large and complex cases. The SEC
stressed the need for development of judicial precedent in cases
involving novel legal theories or challenging established industry
practices.7 To the SEC, it was also important that the public
understand the arbitration process, in contrast to the SROs'
traditional view of arbitration as a confidential matter between the
parties.
Discovery. A new rule provided for a discovery process that
would allow parties to obtain information and documents in
sufficient time to prepare for a hearing.72 Arbitrators would be
involved in the discovery process through a pre-hearing
conference between the parties and the arbitrators, and at least
one arbitrator would participate in settling discovery disputes.
Limited use of depositions was also authorized.
Record of Hearing. Another rule provided that a verbatim
record of a hearing must be kept, either by stenographic reporter
or tape recording,73 for judicial review of the proceedings.
Awards. Finally, a new rule expanded both the contents and
the public availability of arbitration awards,74 but did not require
that arbitrators set forth reasons for their decisions. The SEC
indicated that this might be an issue that it would revisit, and it
stated that it expected SICA to consider making opinions a
requirement in large and complex cases.
This comparison of the pre-McMahon and post-McMahon
Codes demonstrates that the changes made the process more like
litigation (discovery, pre-hearing conference, publication of
awards, requirement of a hearing record). SEC recommendations
70 See id. At that time an SEC survey showed that only 39 percent of cash accounts
required a PDAA. "The continuation of such investor access to brokerage services
without having to sign a PDAA is a significant factor in the Commission's evaluation of
this matter." Id.
71 See id.
72 See NAT'L AssoC. OF SECURITIES DEALERS, CODE OF ARBITRATION
PROCEDURE § 32, in NASD MANUAL (CCH) (1989) [hereinafter NASD CODE 1989].
The Code reflecting the 1989 rule changes is set forth as Exhibit 20 to Deborah Masucci
and Edward W. Morris, Jr., Arbitration at the National Association of Securities Dealers
and the New York Stock Exchange, SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1989, at 437, 530 (PLI
Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 650, 1989). For a current version of
the Code that includes the 1989 amendments, see NAT'L ASSOC. OF SECURITIES
DEALERS, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE § 10321 (2002), available at
http://www.nasdadr.com/arb-code/arb_code.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2002) [hereinafter
NASD CODE 2002].
73 See NASD CODE 1989, supra note 72, § 37.
74 See id. § 41.
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that relate to training arbitrators in the law they should apply or
requiring arbitrators to state the law they are applying were, in
contrast, not adopted.
E. More Recent Developments
Securities arbitration practice has continued to become more
and more like litigation. Motion practice has become standard,
although controversy exists about whether pre-hearing motions to
dismiss are permitted under the Code.75 In 1995, NASD adopted a
rule providing special procedures for large and complex cases. 6
The rule is designed to facilitate settlement discussions and orderly
management of the arbitration process, but it does not provide a
device for referring legal issues to a judicial forum, nor does it
require arbitrators to set forth reasons unless all the parties
specifically agree.
Moreover, at the NASD, significant rule changes have
transformed the process of arbitrator selection, so that the parties
mutually agree upon the arbitrators. This rule change was in
response to continuing doubts about the independence of the SRO
forum.7 The NASD has described this change as the one that
claimants' attorneys most wanted; an unfortunate consequence,
however, has been to create further delays in the arbitration
process.
F. The Ruder Report's Recommendations
The Board of Governors of the NASD appointed an
Arbitration Policy Task Force in 1994 to study the arbitration
process and make suggestions for its reform. The Task Force's
report, widely known as the "Ruder Report" after its Chair,
former SEC Chair David S. Ruder, confirmed that arbitration had
15 The controversy involves the interpretation of NASD Code § 10303 and its
requirement of a "hearing." Sheldon v. Vermonty, 269 F.3d 1.202 (10th Cir. 2001), held
that a NASD arbitration panel can grant a pre-hearing motion to dismiss with prejudice
based solely on the parties' pleadings, without permitting claimant discovery, so long as
the dismissal does not deny a party fundamental fairness. Since the panel gave claimant
an opportunity to brief and argue the motion to dismiss, the court concluded he was
provided with a fundamentally fair arbitration proceeding. See id. at 1207.
76 See NASD CODE 2002, supra note 72, § 10334. This rule has not been frequently
used and is not viewed as a success.
77 See Cheryl Nichols, Arbitrator Selection at the NASD: Investor Perception of a Pro-
Securities Industry Bias, 15 OHIO ST. J. DisP. RESOL. 63, 67 (1999).
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become more litigious"8 and expressed concern that "the
increasingly litigious nature of securities arbitration has gradually
eroded the advantages of SRO arbitration."79
The Report sets forth a number of recommendations that
seek to improve the efficiency of the process, including the
expansion of a voluntary mediation program to prove a more
informal alternative to arbitration!8° The Ruder Report attempts
to find a middle ground for arbitration, retaining its traditional
advantages and yet meeting the demand for increased
professionalism." The Report assumes, but does not closely
examine the question, that arbitrators should be applying the law;
this is made clear in its recommendation that arbitrators should
receive more training in substantive law. 2 Its most explicit
statement to this effect is found in a note: "Although we recognize
that arbitration generally is considered to be an equitable forum,
we believe that arbitrators should consider applicable statutory
and common law with respect to all matters as to which they must
make decisions in the arbitration forum .... "83
The Ruder Report's recommendations on punitive damages,
the most hotly debated issue between the sides, illustrate its
ambivalence. Investors assert that they should have the same right
to recover punitive damages in arbitration as they have in court.
Brokers, on the other hand, assert that punitive damages are
inappropriate in arbitration because procedural safeguards and the
right of appeal are limited.' The Ruder Report recommends that
78 See SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM: REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY
TASK FORCE TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES
DEALERS, INC. (1996) [hereinafter RUDER REPORT] at 7. The Report lists several factors
commonly cited as contributing to litigious arbitration: (i) significant increase in motion
practice relating to discovery, eligibility, statutes of limitations, and other pre-hearing
matters; (ii) a "somewhat intangible, but widely perceived" increase in a lawyering
approach to arbitration, illustrated by extensive discovery requests, stonewalling on
responses to discovery, and attempts to delay hearings for tactical reasons; (iii) resort to
the courts, frequently to challenge the eligibility of a claim for arbitration or to assert a
statute of limitations defense; (iv) a departure from the relaxed evidentiary and
procedural standards that were meant to guide arbitration; and (v) hearings that take
longer than the one or two days expected for resolution of customer claims. Id.
79 Id.
80 See id. at 47.
81 See, e.g., id. at 88 (discussing the need for a more professional corps of arbitrators).
82 See id. at 108-10.
83 Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
84 Recent Supreme Court holdings announcing due process limitations on the award of
punitive damages lend support to these arguments. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman
Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001). Circuit courts have split on whether due process
limitations are applicable in securities arbitration. Compare Glennon v. Dean Witter, 83
F.3d 132 (6th Cir. 1996) (assumes due process concerns are applicable), with Davis v.
Prudential Securities, Inc., 59 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1995) (asserts due process concerns are
not applicable).
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responses to discovery, and atte pts to ela  eari gs f r t ti l r ; iii) rt t  
the courts, frequently to challenge the eli i ilit  f  l i  f r r itration  t  t  
statute of li itations defense; (iv) a departure fr  t  r l  i tiary  
procedural standards that ere eant t  i e ar itrati ;  ( ) ri s t t t  
longer than the one r t  a s e ecte  f r r s l ti  f t r l i . l . 
79 ! . 
  .  
8! See, e.g., id. at 88 (discussing t e ee  f r  re r f i l   t t r ). 
82  i .  . 
83 l . t  sis . 
84 Recent Supre e Court holdings announcing due process li itations  t e a ar  f 
punitive da ages lend support to these argu ents.  r I s., I . . t er an 
Tool roup, Inc., 532 .S. 424 (2001). ircuit courts have s lit  t r  r  
limitations are applicable in securities arbitration. o pare lennon v. ea  itter,  
F.3d 132 (6th Cir. 1996) (assu es due process concerns are applicable), ith avis v. 
Prudential Securities, Inc., 59 .   ( t  ir. 5) ( rts  r cess erns re . 
not applicable). 
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investors be able to recover punitive damages in arbitration in
situations where courts in the relevant state would award them
(even if the relevant state did not recognize the authority of
arbitrators to award punitive damages), but the amount of punitive
damages awarded in arbitration should be capped. This result
can be described as the arbitrators considering the local law, but
not applying it.
In sum, the SEC and SROs have spent considerable time and
effort since McMahon to amend procedural rules governing
securities arbitrations-all in the name of neutrality and fairness.
By contrast, little change has occurred in the area of substantive
law; i.e., adding substantive protections to ensure that the
arbitrators are in fact applying the law and thus vindicating
statutory rights of claimants according to the Supreme Court's
mandate. As discussed below, the current ability of arbitrators to
apply the law governing customer-broker disputes is limited by
numerous factors.
III. LIMITS ON THE ARBITRATORS' APPLICATION OF THE LAW
Embedded in the Supreme Court's assumption in McMahon
that the arbitrators will apply the law is another assumption: that
the law is sufficiently clear so that arbitrators, even those who are
not trained as lawyers, can apply it to the facts of the individual
case with some instruction by the SROs, supplemented, if
necessary, with legal briefs submitted by counsel representing the
parties Unfortunately, neither in 1987 nor since has the law been
that clear, and the SROs provide virtually no instruction on
applicable law. Even if the arbitrators request parties to brief the
legal issues, an arbitrator faced with legal briefs asserting
conflicting positions on the law may well be hard pressed to "apply
the law." While SRO rules authorize the arbitrators to dismiss an
arbitration proceeding and "refer the parties to their judicial
remedies,"87 our research has found no case where the arbitrators
85 See RUDER REPORT, supra note 78, at 36-45.
86 In an article predating the boom in the privatization of the law, Professor William
M. Landes and Professor (now Judge) Richard A. Posner examined the dispute resolution
and rule creation functions of adjudication from an efficiency perspective. William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 249
(1979) (arguing commercial arbitration works best when the rules are clear and the only
issue is their application to the facts).
87 NASD CODE 2002, supra note 72, § 10305(a). The Rule permits arbitrators, either
upon their own initiative or at a party's request, to dismiss cases without prejudice and
refer the parties to their judicial remedies. The Arbitrator's Manual indicates that
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have done this because they believed that the law was too
uncertain or even unknown.
A. The Law Governing Broker-Dealer Conduct Is Complex
The theoretical underpinnings for the law governing the
relationship between broker-dealers and their customers are a
complex mixture of federal securities statutes,8 state securities
statutes, and state common law principles of contract, agency, and
fiduciary duties. Courts have inconsistently asserted that the
relationship between a broker and its customer is largely
controlled by federal securities laws, on the one hand, and
principally a matter of state contract law, on the other.8 This
section first contrasts the general theories of imposing liability
under federal and state law and then discusses the legal principles
relating to the most common customers' claims and with respect to
damages.
Federal Law. Any discussion of a broker's duties to its
customers under federal securities law must start with the "shingle
theory," developed by the SEC under the antifraud provisions of
the federal securities laws as a unitary principle underlying the
broker-dealer's responsibilities to its customers. ° By holding itself
out as a broker-dealer, the broker represents that it will treat its
customers fairly and professionally. What constitutes fair and
professional conduct may be embodied in the securities industry's
own rules of fair conduct, as, for example, the broker's obligation
to have a reasonable basis for any recommendations and a
broker's obligation to charge fair prices.
The "shingle theory," with its emphasis on professional
standards, however, developed prior to the Supreme Court's
emphasis on the necessity of fraud under section 10(b) and Rule
arbitrators may exercise this authority when, among other reasons, the case involves
"substantial legal issues for which the establishment of a legal precedent is important."
See infra note 246 and accompanying text at 8.
88 For example, see Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994),
and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999).
89 Compare Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 444 (2d Cir. 1971)
(characterizing customer's claim that broker improperly liquidated account to meet
margin deficiency as "nothing more than a garden-variety customer's suit against broker
for breach of contract") with Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co., 89 N.Y.2d 31, 46-47 (1996)
(stating that customer's common law breach of fiduciary duty claims regarding broker's
receipt of order flow payments are preempted by federal regulation; allowing the state
claim would defeat congressional purpose of a "coherent regulatory structure" for a
national market system).
9o See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943).
1006 [Vol. 23:3
HeinOnline -- 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 1006 2001-2002
    
    
 
i g r- ealer t  
 l   
l ti i  t  r   
 tutes,88   
l    
i i  . t tl    
i   r  
l     
ll    t 9  
 l  
  
 rs'  
 
 '    
 l  
,"    
t      
ler's  90   
l r,  t    
   
r f i l t    '  
 r l  f f ir t, ,  l , t  '   
t    l  i    tions  
'   
l    
t r , r, l  i     '  
e asis  t e ecessit  f fr  r ti  IO( )  l  
arbitrators a  e ercise t is a t rit  ,  t r r , t   i l s 
"substantial legal issues for which the establishment of a legal precedent i  i rt t." 
     i g   
AA r l ,  riti   t  1   lO , c  ) ), 
c.F. . lO  
  t  . , ill    1) 
( r t rizing t r'  l i  t t    t  t 
r i  fi i   t i   t   i t  r's t r 
for breach f c tract") ith ice . arles   .,  . .  , -  ( ) 
( t ti  t t t r'   l    i i  t   '  
receipt of order flo  pay ents are ree te   f r l r l ti ; ll i  t  t t  
l i  l  f t r i l    r t t r  t re"  
ti l t . 
lJ()  rl    . . ,  .    . . 
2002] MAKING IT UP AS THEY GO ALONG 1007
10b-5. While the Supreme Court, beginning in the mid-1970s, was
actively engaged in developing the elements of the implied cause
of action under Rule lOb-5, only a few of the significant cases
involved allegations of broker-dealer misconduct toward
customers,91 and none of them examined the implications of
securities fraud on the "shingle theory.
92
To establish federal securities fraud under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, the investor must establish that the broker acted with
scienter 93 and deception.94 The Supreme Court has not yet defined
what level of culpability establishes scienter, but it requires at least
reckless conduct.95 Moreover, it is not clear whether the element
of deception is present if a broker's unprofessional conduct is fully
disclosed.96
State law. Brokers may be liable for misconduct under a
number of state law theories, either in tort or in contract. A
broker may be liable for intentional misstatements of material fact
as common law fraud97 or under state securities law.98 In addition,
some states may allow for holding brokers liable for negligent
misstatements, either under common law99 or the state securities
91 See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985) (dealing with
the in pani delicto defense in inside trading); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (involving
failure to supervise brokers who made unfounded recommendations, although the facts
played no part in the Court's abstract treatment of the legal issue, standard of culpability
under § 17(a) of the Securities Act); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (involving an inside
trading case and the liability of "tippee"); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988) (involving an
instance where an investor sued a broker, but the issue in the case, the definition of
"seller," focused on the activities of the plaintiff).
92 One commentator has questioned whether the shingle theory is still a viable theory
of relief for private investors. See Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271 (1995).
93 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
94 See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
9 The Supreme Court has left open the question of whether recklessness constitutes
scienter. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193, n.12.
96 See Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud and Deception by Securities Professionals, 61 TEX.
L. REV. 1247 (1983).
97 In New York, to establish fraud, plaintiff must establish (i) a misrepresentation of a
material fact; (ii) the falsity of that misrepresentation; (iii) scienter, or intent to defraud;
(iv) reasonable reliance on that representation; and (v) damages caused by that reliance.
See Granite Partners, L.P. v. Bear, Steams & Co., 58 F. Supp. 2d 228, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
But see Gordon & Co. v. Ross, 84 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the standard is not
reasonable reliance, but justifiable reliance, which is a lower standard). A plaintiff must
prove every element by clear and convincing evidence. See Leucadia, Inc. v. Reliance Ins.
Co., 864 F.2d 964, 971 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Hutt v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 95
A.D.2d 255 (2d Dep't 1983)).
98 In New York, there is no private right of action under the state securities law (the
Martin Act). See CPC Int'l v. McKesson Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 268 (1987).
99 In New York, the elements of negligent misrepresentation under common law are
"carelessness in imparting words upon which others were expected to rely and upon which
they did act or failed to act to their damage," and the author must express the information
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statute. °0  A broker's liability for conduct not involving
misrepresentations may be premised on breach of contract'0' or
breach of fiduciary duty theories. °2
In New York, as in many states, there is considerable
discussion about the circumstances that create a fiduciary
relationship between a customer and his broker. 3 There is
general agreement that the ordinary broker-customer relationship,
by itself, does not impose duties on the broker beyond those
specifically entrusted to him.'0' A discount broker's duties to its
customers are generally limited by the contract, in recognition that
the customer pays reduced commissions for reduced attention. 5
In contrast, where the customer entrusts his broker with discretion
over the account, courts generally find that a fiduciary relationship
exists.0 6 Between these two extremes, the cases are intensely fact
specific and provide little predictive value. Factors-a long
standing business or personal relationship, for example-may
make it reasonable for the customer to expect that the relationship
between him and his broker is not simply one of contract, but one
of trust and confidence;'07 this is sometimes referred to as the
"special circumstances" doctrine.
Common Claims of Broker Misconduct. The next section
summarizes the legal issues involved in the most common
customers' claims, what are frequently referred to colloquially as
"directly, with knowledge or notice that it will be acted upon, to one to whom the author is
bound by some relation of duty.., to act with care if he acts at all .... " White v.
Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 363 (1977). The New York intermediate appellate courts have
split over whether the state's securities law (the Martin Act) bars a securities claim for
negligent mispresentations. See Cromer Finance Ltd. v. Berger, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
91,550 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing cases).
'00 Florida's securities statute allows recovery for negligent misrepresentations. See
Gochnauer v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 810 F.2d 1042, 1046 (11th Cir. 1987).
101 Courts sometimes also discuss claims sounding in negligence (tort), but a duty of
reasonable care arises because of a contract between the parties.
102 Breach of agency is also frequently asserted, but since that involves either a breach
of contract or a breach of fiduciary duty, it is not analyzed separately here.
103 New York cases are reviewed in De Kwiatowski v. Bear Steams & Co., 126 F. Supp.
2d 672, 690-696 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). While there has been doubt whether New York
recognized breach of fiduciary duty claims in connection with the sale of securities, recent
decisions have allowed it. See Scalp & Blade, Inc. v. Advest, Inc., 281 A.D.2d 882 (4th
Dep't 2001).
104 See Bissell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 937 F. Supp. 237, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Rush v.
Oppenheimer & Co., 681 F. Supp. 1045, 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting Fey v. Walston &
Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 1974)).
105 See Unity House v. N. Pac. Inv., 918 F. Supp. 1384 (D. Ha. 1996).
106 See McAdam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 F.2d 750, 766 (3d Cir. 1990).
107 See NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION §§ 2.01-2.02
(1995), for a good discussion on the topic. The courts sometimes talk of a "fiduciary
relationship" between the broker and customer, when it seems that on a breach of
contract theory the broker would be liable.
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"SCUM" claims: suitability, churning, unauthorized trading and
misrepresentations, and the law relating to damages. While there
are many cases (most of them decided before McMahon)
analyzing these claims, the law is far from settled.
Misrepresentations. To prevail on a fraud claim under federal
law, the investor must establish that the broker, with scienter, °8
made misstatements of material facts or omitted to disclose
material facts when he had a duty to do so (deception) 109 on which
the investor justifiably relied in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities."0
The investor must establish justifiable reliance as an element
of his case."' Courts have identified numerous factors to take into
account in determining whether the investor's claim should be
barred because of his own lack of diligence:
(1) the sophistication and expertise of the [investor] in financial
and securities matters; (2) the existence of long standing
business or personal relationships; (3) access to the relevant
information; (4) the existence of a fiduciary relationship; (5)
concealment of the fraud; (6) the opportunity to detect the
fraud; (7) whether the [investor] initiated the stock transaction
or sought to expedite the transaction; and (8) the generality or
specificity of the misrepresentations." 2
At a minimum, an investor cannot justifiably rely on a
misrepresentation "where its falsity is palpable."" 3
Nevertheless, while courts state that no one factor is
determinative, they do not hesitate to find as a matter of law that
investor's reliance on oral statements is not justified where he has
received documents disclosing the risks."4  The level of care
expected of an investor has not been authoritatively established;
most cases state that an investor cannot recover if, on an objective
investor standard, his conduct was reckless.'15
Alleged misstatements of material fact by a broker may also
108 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
109 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
110 See Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993). Under
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") § 21D(f)(10)(A)(i)(II), to find a
defendant "knowingly committed" a violation of the securities law requires not only
"actual knowledge" that the statement is false, but also that "persons are likely to
reasonably rely" on it. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
67, 109 Stat. 743.
I11 See generally Margaret V. Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule lOb-
5: Should Careless Plaintiffs Be Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 96 (1985).
112 Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983).
113 Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 955 (1977).
114 See, e.g., Zobrist, 708 F.2d at 1511; Brown, 991 F.2d at 1020.
115 See Brown, 991 F.2d at 1032.
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give rise, as discussed above, to state law claims based on
fraudulent"6 or negligent misrepresentations,"7 although the
elements the investors must prove and the available defenses may
vary from state to state.
Suitability. A broker, in recommending a security to a
customer or in making purchases in a discretionary account, "shall
have" reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation
or purchase is suitable for the customer and "shall make"
reasonable efforts to obtain relevant information to make such a
determination, including information concerning the customer's
financial status, tax status, and investment objectives."8
In order to establish federal securities fraud based on
unsuitable recommendations, the investor must establish more
than unsuitable recommendations by a broker, he must also
establish that the broker acted with scienter and that the customer
justifiably relied on the broker's fraudulent conduct.' It is not
clear whether unsuitable purchases made by a broker for a
discretionary account constitute federal securities fraud where the
broker had made no misrepresentations, given the Supreme
Court's emphasis on "deception.' 20  Claims of unsuitable
recommendations or purchases may also be brought under state
law either as misrepresentation claims ' or as claims for breach of
fiduciary duty.22Churning. Churning is excessive trading by a broker in a
116 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
117 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
118 NAT'L Assoc. OF SECURITIES DEALERS, CONDUCT RULES § 2310,
Recommendations to Customers (Suitability) (2002), available at http://secure.nasdr.com/
wbs/NETbos.dll?RefShow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=http://www.nasdadr.com (last visited Mar.
31, 2002). See generally Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Suitability in Securities
Transactions, 54 Bus. LAW. 1557 (1999).
119 The court in Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 600-01 (2d Cir.
1978), set forth the elements. A plaintiff must prove (1) that the securities purchased were
unsuited to the buyer's needs; (2) that the defendant knew or reasonably believed the
securities were unsuited to the buyer's needs; (3) that the defendant recommended or
purchased the unsuitable securities anyway; (4) that, with scienter, the defendant made
material misrepresentations (or, owing a duty to the buyer, failed to disclose material
information) relating to the suitability of the securities; and (5) that the buyer justifiably
relied to its detriment on the defendant's fraudulent conduct. See id. The Second Circuit
reaffirmed these elements in Brown, 991 F.2d at 1031.
12o See Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud and Deception by Securities Professionals, 61 TEX.
L. REV. 1247 (1983). Some courts have found that the conduct itself is securities fraud.
See, e.g., O'Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 965 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding investor
must establish that the broker exercised control over the account to establish justifiable
reliance); Clark v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 636 F. Supp. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). But see
Morlock v. Shepherd, 1999 WL 12121.97 (N.D. I11. Dec. 16, 1999) (finding no Rule 10b-5
liability where unsuitable investment strategy in discretionary account).
121 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
122 See generally POSER, supra note 107, § 3.03[C].
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118 NAT'L Assoc. OF SECURITIES DEALERS, CONDUCT RULES § 2310, 
Recommendations to usto ers (Suitability) ( ), il l  t tt ://secure.nasdr.coml 
wbsINEThos.dll?RefShow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=http://www.nasdadr.com (l st i it  . 
31, 2002). See generally e is . e fels  l  . , it  ti s 
ransactions,  . .  ). 
119 The court in Clark v. John a ula Investors, I c.,  .  ,   
1978), set forth the ele ents.  plaintiff ust prove ( ) t at t e s riti s rc ased re 
unsuited to the buyer's needs; (2) that the defendant e  r r ly  t e 
securities .were unsuited to the buyer's needs; ( ) t t t  fendant e  r 
purchased the unsuitable sec rities ay;  t t, it  i t r,  t  
material isrepresentations (or, o ing a duty t  t  r, f il  t  isclose t rial 
information) relating to the suitability of the securities; a  ( ) t at t   j tifiably 
relied to its detriment on the defendant's fraudulent conduct. ee i .  nd i it 
reaffir ed t ese l ents i  ,  .2d t 1. 
120 See Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud and eception by ec rities r f ssi nals,  Ex. 
L. REV. 1247 (1983). So e courts have found that the c nduct its lf is rities . 
See, e.g., 'Connor v. .F. afferty  .,  .   ( th i . 2) l ing i vestor 
must establish that the broker exercised control over the acc t to st lish j tifiable 
reliance); Clark v. Kidder Peabody  o., 636 . upp.  ( . . . . ). t  
orlock v. Shepherd, 1999 L 1212197 ( . . III. . 6, 99) (finding o le lO  
liability where unsuitable invest ent strategy in iscretionary account). 
121 See supra notes 97-99 and acco panying text. 
122 See generally , s r  te 7, § .03[C]. 
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customer's account in order to generate commissions. 123 As with
suitability allegations, churning raises the question of whether
Rule 10b-5 fraud can be established by conduct alone or whether
misrepresentation ("deception") is required."4 In addition to
establishing that the trading is excessive 125 in light of the investor's
investment objectives'26 and that the broker had control 7 over the
account, the investor must establish scienter 2 8  Courts have
divided on whether churning allegations can be brought as a state
law breach of fiduciary duty claim. 9  Finally, the theory for
calculating damages in a churning case is unsettled.3 '
Unauthorized Trading. Unauthorized trading by a broker
does not constitute securities fraud, 3' but states a breach of
123 See Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 709 F.2d 1413, 1416 (11th Cir.
1983).
124 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
125 There are different approaches for determining what is excessive trading. Many
cases focus on the turnover ratio: the ratio of the total cost of purchases made for the
account during a given period to the total amount invested in the account. See, e.g.,
Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 767 F.2d 1498 (1th Cir. 1985).
Others look at the volume of commissions, either as a percentage of the broker's or
branch's income or in relation to comparable accounts handled by other brokers. See, e.g.,
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), affd in part, 430 F.2d
1202 (9th Cir. 1970); see also Donald Arthur Winslow & Seth C. Anderson, A Model for
Determining the Excessive Trading Element in Churning Claims, 68 N.C. L. REv. 327
(1990) (discussing guidelines for turnover rates through comparison with turnover in
mutual funds with a similar risk preference).
126 In the typical case, the parties portray different pictures of the investor and his
investment objectives, with the customer asserting that he is an inexperienced investor
with conservative goals and the broker asserting that the customer was a sophisticated
investor with speculative objectives. See, e.g., Thompson, 709 F.2d at 1413.
127 SEC Rule 15cl-7 defines churning in the context of discretionary accounts, but it is
clear that brokers may have de facto control over non-discretionary accounts. 17 C.F.R. §
240.15cl-7 (2001). What facts will demonstrate control is problematic. Compare
Arceneaux, 767 F.2d at 1502 (involving a broker controlled account even though customer
was well-educated and experienced options trader, because customer was "somewhat
intimidated" by broker), with Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 677 (9th
Cir. 1982) (finding that the focus should be on whether the customer has the intelligence
and understanding to evaluate the broker's recommendations). See also Patricia A.
O'Hara, The Elusive Concept of Control in Churning Cases under Federal Securities and
Commodities Laws, 75 GEO. L.J. 1875 (1987) (stating that the control test is the functional
equivalent of the reliance test in misrepresentation cases).
128 See O'Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 965 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1992).
129 Courts that have allowed it include Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 619 F.2d 814
(9th Cir. 1980) (California law); Miley, 637 F.2d 318 (Texas law); Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288
F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (New York law). For a contrary view, see McGinn v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 736 F.2d 1254 (8th Cir. 1984) (Minn. law).
See also POSER, supra note 107, § 3.02[A].
130 There are two possible elements of damages-the amount of the excessive
commissions and the decline in the value of the portfolio, and the latter may or may not
take into account the overall performance of the stock market. Compare Twomey v.
Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968), with Miley v. Oppenheimer
& Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981). See also O'Hara, supra note 127, at 1896-1900.
131 See, e.g., Messer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 833 F.2d 909 (11th Cir. 1987); Brophy v.
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contract 32 or breach of fiduciary duty claim.'33 Allegations that the
broker did not follow a customer's instructions to sell, whether or
not accompanied by misrepresentations, also do not constitute
Rule lOb-5 fraud, since it is not fraud "in connection with" a
purchase or sale. 34
Damages. There are many theories for calculating damages
for broker-dealer misconduct, but little directly applicable caselaw.
To illustrate the complexities, this section will focus on remedies
available to an investor who purchased securities in reliance on
material misrepresentations by the broker. 35
The most common measure of damages is the tort-based out
of pocket recovery-the difference between the amount paid for
the security and its actual value at the time of the transaction.'36
This method ignores post-transaction events except to the extent
they provide evidence as to the "actual" value; i.e., what the
security is worth when the truth becomes known is evidence of
what it would have been worth at the time of the transaction if the
broker had not lied. Under PSLRA, whenever a plaintiff seeks to
establish damages by reference to a market price, the award of
damages cannot exceed the difference between his purchase price
and the mean trading price of that security during the 90-day
period beginning on the date on which the corrective information
is disseminated to the market.'37
Many courts allow, at least in some circumstances, damages
based on rescission of the transaction-a return of the purchase
Redivo, 725 F.2d 1218 (9th Cir. 1984).
132 Courts sometimes also talk about claims sounding in negligence (tort), but a duty of
reasonable care arises because of a contract between the parties. See DeKwiatkowski v.
Bear Stearns & Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 672, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
133 See, e.g., Baum v. Phillips, Appel & Walden, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1518, 1525 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), affd, 867 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1989).
134 See Gambella v. Guardian Investor Services Corp., 75 F. Supp. 2d 297 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
135 With respect to defrauded sellers, the Supreme Court, in Affiliated Ute Citizens of
Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972), found that the correct measure of damages
was the difference between the fair value of the consideration received by the seller and
the fair value of what he would have received had there been no fraudulent conduct,
except where the defendant received more than the seller's actual loss, in which case the
seller is entitled to receive the defendant's profit. See supra note 130, for issues relating to
churning violations. For issues arising from fraudulent conduct in managing a portfolio,
see Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 48-50 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978), modified, 637 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1980) and Miley, 637 F.2d
at 327-28 (both involving market-adjusted measure of damages).
'36 See, e.g., Harris v. Am. Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 225 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1054 (1976).
137 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1) (1994). Under § 21D(e)(2), if the plaintiff sells the securities
prior to the expiration of the 90-day period, that cuts off the period of time for calculating
the mean trading price.
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price for the securities or, if the securities have been sold by the
investor, the difference between the purchase price and the value
of the security upon disposition. 38  The difficulty with the
rescission measure is that it may allow the plaintiff to recover for
the full amount of the post-transaction decline in the value of the
security, unless the defendant can prove that some portion of the
decline is unrelated to the fraud. PSLRA explicitly puts the
burden on the plaintiff to prove the defendant's misrepresentation
"caused the loss" for which the plaintiff seeks to recover
damages;'39 this would seem to preclude a plaintiff's recovery, on a
rescissionary theory, for declines in value unrelated to defendant's
fraud.140
Some courts will allow recovery on a contract-based benefit of
the bargain theory-the difference between the value of the
security received and the value of the security if the
misrepresentations had been truthful, but only if the latter can be
established with sufficient certainty.'4' Finally, state law may allow
recovery of punitive damages which the federal securities laws
prohibit.'42
In sum, federal and state law applicable to broker-dealer
conduct is complex and unsettled. This complexity and lack of
clarity makes it difficult for arbitrators to apply the law to the
disputes they resolve. In the next section, we examine another
limitation on the ability of the arbitrators to apply the law: the lack
of development of the law since 1987.
B. Opportunities for Development of the Law Governing
Broker-Dealer Disputes Are Limited
With the nearly universal use by brokers of PDAAs, there are
few opportunities for customers to sue broker-dealers in court, and
yet there are many unresolved issues in the law regulating broker-
dealer conduct. 143  This section examines judicial and
138 The Supreme Court, in Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647 (1986), assumed that
rescission may be an appropriate theory in some circumstances, since the defendant did
not contest it.
139 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4).
140 Under PSLRA, defendants who have not "knowingly committed" securities fraud
are not jointly and severally liable for the full amount of damages, but are liable solely for
the portion of the judgment that corresponds to their percentage of responsibility as
determined under the statute. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(2)(A)-(B). The definition of
"knowingly commits" excludes reckless conduct. Id. § 78u-4(f)(10)(B).
141 See Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Milken, 17 F.3d 608,614 (2d Cir. 1994).
142 See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 806 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1986).
143 See supra notes 88-142 and accompanying text.
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administrative opportunities to review and develop standards for
broker-dealer conduct in the post-McMahon era.
1. Motions to Vacate An Arbitration Award
As previously discussed,'4 4 McMahon assumed the judicially-
created doctrine of "manifest disregard" of the law would allow
limited judicial scrutiny of the merits of an arbitration.' 45  As a
result, opinions considering motions to vacate on this ground
might have occasion to discuss the relevant substantive law, but
since the court would be concerned with whether or not the
arbitrators ignored or refused to apply "well-defined and clearly
applicable law," it seems there would be little opportunity for a
court to make new law in the resulting opinion.'46
2. Actions Brought by Customers
Class Actions. Since the SRO arbitration rules do not permit
class actions against broker-dealers,' 47  brokers cannot assert
PDAAs to bar investors from bringing class actions in court.148
Since common questions of law and fact must predominate,' 9 class
actions are generally not appropriate vehicles where customers
allege suitability or churning violations. In the post-McMahon
years, plaintiffs have brought class actions where the allegations
involve allegedly illegal business practices that affect numerous
customers' 0 or widely disseminated misstatements.'5 ' Class actions
144 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
145 The scope of this standard of review is discussed infra notes 271-75 and
accompanying text.
146 See, e.g., Greenberg v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 220 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2000); Dawahare v.
Spencer, 210 F.3d 666 (6th Cir. 2000); Sav-A-Trip, Inc. v. Belfort, 164 F.3d 1137 (8th Cir.
1999).
147 See NASD CODE 2002, supra note 72, § 10301(d)(1).
148 See Nielson v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 66 F.3d 145 (7th Cir. 1995).
"49 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). See also Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 259 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2001) (denying class certification to a lawsuit claiming
violations of the broker's duty of best execution because individual issues of economic loss
would predominate over common issues of law and fact).
150 See, e.g., Grandon v. Merrill Lynch, 147 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 1998) (excessive markups);
Ettinger v. Merrill Lynch, 835 F.2d 1031 (3d Cir. 1987) (same); Guice v. Charles Schwab &
Co., 89 N.Y.2d 31 (1996) (receipt of order flow payments; complaint dismissed on grounds
federal regulation preempted the field); accord Dahl v. Charles Schwab & Co., 545
N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1996).
Plaintiffs' allegations are rooted in the "shingle theory." Since the broker's conduct
does not meet the standards for competent professionals in the industry, the broker's
failure to disclose the conduct ig an implied misrepresentation that is actionable under
1014 [Vol. 23:3
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may be appropriate vehicles for online traders to challenge
discount brokers' practices. 15 2
The circumstances in which courts will permit customers to
bring class actions against brokers have become more difficult to
predict since the enactment of the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA"). SLUSA precludes any class
action where the complaint alleges securities fraud,153 even if based
on state law, involving a "covered" security, 54 unless the complaint
meets the stringent pleading requirements of PSLRA.'55 Securities
fraud class actions filed in state court can be removed to federal
court and then dismissed unless plaintiffs comply with the pleading
requirements. Courts may dismiss class action complaints alleging
state law breach of fiduciary duty or contract claims if the court
finds that the gravamen is securities fraud. While Congressional
intent was to protect issuers of high tech companies,156 courts have
relied on the literal language of the Act and legislative history that
Congress intended the federal courts as "the exclusive venue for
most securities class action lawsuits" involving nationally traded
securities '57 to apply its provisions to class actions against brokers.
Abada v. Charles Schwab & Co. 8 illustrates the uncertainties.
Plaintiff brought a class action in state court on behalf of online
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if made with the requisite scienter. See supra note 90 and
accompanying text.
151 See, e.g., O'Malley v. Boris, 742 A.2d 845 (Del. 1999) (discussing adequacy of
broker's disclosures about switching money market funds for "sweep" accounts); Varljen
v. H.J. Meyers, Inc., [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 90,259 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (noting that broker's misstatements and other conduct artificially inflated the
market value of stock).
152 As discussed infra notes 306-09 and accompanying text, the outcomes are not likely
to be favorable to investors.
153 SLUSA preempts "covered class actions" based on state law claims in which
plaintiffs allege either a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection
with the purchase and sale of a covered security or that the defendant used or employed
any manipulative or deceptive device or other contrivance in connection with the purchase
and sale of a covered security. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(2) (1994); see also id. §
78bb(f)(5)(B)(i)-(ii) (defining covered class actions).
1'4 See id. § 77r(b). A "covered security" is one that either (1) is "listed, or authorized
for listing, on the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange, or listed
on the National Market System of the Nasdaq Stock Market (or any successor to such
entities)" or (2) is issued by a registered investment company. Id.
155 See discussion infra notes 289-90 and accompanying text.
156 The Congressional purpose in enacting SLUSA and PSLRA was to protect issuers,
especially those in the high tech industry, from class action "strike suits." Courts have
rejected arguments that would limit its applicability to issuers. But see Shaw v. Charles
Schwab & Co., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("The legislative history does
not indicate that Congress was especially worried about brokerage companies that have
purposefully availed themselves of business opportunities in jurisdictions with onerous
laws.").
157 Prager v. KnightlTrimark Group, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 229,233 (D. N.J. 2000).
158 68 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (S.D. Cal. 1999), vacated 127 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (2000).
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investors, asserting that defendant did not live up to its
representations that it would provide fast, high quality execution
of trades. Defendant removed the case to federal court under
SLUSA and then moved to dismiss under PSLRA. The trial judge
granted defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that plaintiff's
claim was securities fraud within the meaning of SLUSA. A year
later, a different trial judge reversed the decision, holding that
plaintiff's complaint stated state law claims that were not
preempted by SLUSA. 159 In the view of the second judge,
plaintiff's claim did not allege securities fraud because it did not
allege misrepresentations relating to the trading or value of any
particular stock and did not allege misconduct like stock
manipulation. Rather the claim alleged a breach of contract. 6° On
this issue, ironically, the narrow interpretations of federal
securities fraud worked to the benefit of the plaintiff.'6'
In contrast, the federal district court found that removal was
proper in Prager v. Knight/Trimark Group, Inc. ,2 where plaintiff's
class action alleged that defendant, a market maker, improperly
used information about customers' intent to trade certain
securities in order to execute its own trades for its own profit
ahead of its customers' trades. Even though the plaintiff stated
only state law claims, the court reasoned it was securities fraud
since plaintiff alleged that over an extended period of time
defendant engaged in a practice of misrepresentations with an
intent to defraud.
As a result of SLUSA, investors' ability to adjudicate disputes
with brokers through the mechanism of class actions may be
significantly limited, depending upon how expansively courts
interpret the statute's coverage.
No PDAA Asserted. A few reported decisions involving
159 See Abada, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1101-03. The second judge thus denied the motion to
dismiss and remanded the action to state court. See id.
160 See also Spielman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2001 WL 1182927
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2001) (concerning alleged misrepresentations about transaction fees);
Shaw v. Charles Schwab & Co., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (concerning
allegations regarding commission rate for web-based trading and the efficacy of the web-
based trading system); Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 795 (D. Neb. 2000)
(concerning allegations regarding failure to provide "real time, last sales information" on
options quotes).
161 Similarly, in Burns v. Prudential Securities, 116 F. Supp. 2d 917 (N.D. Ohio. 2000),
fifty customers of one broker survived a motion to dismiss a class action under SLUSA
where the allegations were based on the broker's actions in liquidating their accounts
without authorization. The court relied on federal cases holding that "unauthorized
trading" was not securities fraud, but a breach of contract claim.
162 124 F. Supp. 2d 229 (D. N.J. 2000). See also Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (preempting class action alleging broker
made misrepresentations about mutual fund to induce purchases).
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customer-broker disputes can be found after 1987. In most
instances, the litigation was commenced before McMahon, or the
customer's agreement predates McMahon and so may not have
included a PDAA. In some instances, it seems clear that there was
not an enforceable PDAA'63 or the broker, for strategic reasons,
chose not to assert the PDAA.164 In a few instances, it is not clear
why the case is in court.'65
In the reported cases that reach the merits of the investor's
claims, the courts do not view the legal issues as novel, and the
courts express no difficulty in applying the existing precedents to
decide the cases. One of these cases, however, resulted in an
opinion in which the judge goes to great lengths to demonstrate
that the legal principles he was applying were well-settled-an
opinion that has generated considerable discussion in the legal and
financial communities.
In De Kwiatkowski v. Bear Stearns & Co,166 the investor, who
at one time had a $6.5 billion position in foreign currency
contracts, recovered $111.5 million (plus pre-judgment interest of
approximately $60 million) from his broker for losses incurred in
the negligent handling of his accounts, principally stemming from
the liquidation of plaintiff's positions necessitated by a sudden fall
in the value of the dollar.'67 The district court upheld the jury's
negligence verdict, finding that there was sufficient evidence to
support the theory that in defendant's overall handling of
plaintiff's accounts the firm failed to exercise the degree of skill
and care a broker would reasonably employ under the
circumstances. The court extensively discussed both the law and
the evidence, in order to demonstrate that the legal principles were
well settled and it is the facts that were extraordinary in this case.
16 See Kingston v. Ameritrade, Inc., 12 P.3d 929 (Mont. 2000) (involving an investor
who raised a justiciable issue over whether an online broker could assert a PDAA
incorporated by reference).
164 For example, if the broker-dealer intends to assert the statute of limitations as an
affirmative defense, it may prefer to do so in a legal proceeding. See, e.g., Coleman & Co.
See., Inc. v. Giaquinto Family Trust, 2000 WL 1683450 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2000); see also
John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 254 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2001) (concerning a situation
where, in response to initiation of arbitration proceedings by claimants, the firm brought a
judicial action seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not bound to arbitrate disputes
involving an associated person's sales of promissory notes to individuals who were not the
firm's customers).
165 See, e.g., De Kwiatowski v. Bear Stearns & Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 672 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
In De Kwiatowski, the customer was very wealthy and had negotiations with the broker
about the terms of their arrangement; there well may not have been a PDAA.
16 126 F. Supp. 2d 672 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
167 The plaintiff originally asserted numerous federal and state claims, but all were
dismissed except for the negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims. The jury did not
find that the defendant breached its fiduciary duty to plaintiff. Id.
2002] 1017
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In particular, it rejected defendant's assertion that a broker's duty
of reasonable care was extremely limited in instances where the
plaintiff's account was denominated nondiscretionary. Instead, the
court held that, under applicable legal precedents, a broker's duty
was determined in the context of the entire history of the
relationship between the customer and the broker, and the jury's
verdict was supportable by the evidence showing "special
circumstances sufficient to remove the case from application of
general rules that pertain to the ordinary broker/client
relationship.' 68
Even in an era where there was a regular production of
judicial opinions examining the duties owed by a securities broker
to its customer, De Kwiatowski would probably be a noteworthy
case, simply by reason of the magnitude of the losses involved.
But there can be no doubt that much of the attention generated by
the case results from the concern that its precedential value will be
disproportionate by reason of the scarcity of legal precedents in
the post-McMahon era.69
3. SEC Enforcement Actions
Additional opportunities to develop standards governing
broker-dealer conduct arise from the SEC's enforcement
functions. Congress created the SEC in the SEA to regulate the
securities industry, enforce the federal securities laws, and protect
investors.'70 The SEC is empowered to investigate and prosecute
violations of the securities laws and regulations by, among others,
broker-dealers.'7 ' The Commission may bring two types of
enforcement proceedings to seek sanctions against such violations.
First, the SEC can bring civil proceedings in federal district courts
against brokers to ensure compliance with the federal securities
laws and its rules or orders, including SRO rules. 2 Appropriate
relief can include injunctions, other ancillary relief and civil
168 Id. at 701.
169 See id. at 677 n.1 (citing some of the media reaction and professional commentary
about the case).
170 See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1994) (establishing Commission guidelines); 17 C.F.R. § 200.1
(1999) (describing the general statement and statutory authority for the Commission); id.
§ 200.2 (describing all of the current statutory functions of the Commission). The SEC can
"delegate, by published order or rule, any of its functions to a division of the Commission,
an individual Commissioner, an administrative law judge, or an employee or employee
board. ... " 15 U.S.C. § 78d-l(a). The SEC has delegated its enforcement functions to the
Division of Enforcement. 17 C.F.R. § 200-30.4.
'7' 15 U.S.C. § 77h-l(a); id. § 78u(a)(1).
172 See id. §§ 78u, 77t.
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penalties. However, the Exchange Act expressly bars the SEC
from bringing a federal court action for violations of SRO rules
unless the SRO itself is "unable" or "unwilling" to bring
enforcement proceedings itself, or "such action is otherwise
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors." '173
Second, the SEC can institute administrative proceedings
against broker-dealers before a hearing officer.'74 Hearing officers
can impose sanctions such as revocation of registration and civil
penalties comparable to those obtainable in court."' The hearing
officer must prepare any initial decisions in writing, which must
include "findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis
therefor, as to all the material issues of fact, law or discretion
presented on the record and the appropriate order, sanction, relief,
or denial thereof." '176 Initial decisions of hearing officers are
published in the SEC Docket.'77
The full Commission may review hearing officer decisions.'78
Written findings and conclusions resulting from that review must
"state the reasons for the action taken and contain a clear showing
that no serious argument of counsel has been disregarded or
overlooked."'79  According to the SEC's Canons of Ethics, this
requirement ensures that the opinion "may contribute some useful
precedent to the growth of the law."'180 All Commission orders and
decisions are published in the SEC Docket.8'
In the last five years, the percentage of SEC enforcement
actions against broker-dealers has averaged 20 percent of its
caseload, most of them involving fraud against customers.'82 While
173 Id. § 78u(f).
174 See id. §§ 77h-1, 78u(a). Pursuant to the SEC Rules of Practice, a hearing officer
presides over any proceeding before the Commission. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.110. The
Commission has delegated the hearing officer function in Commission-instituted
proceedings to Administrative Law Judges chosen by the Commission's Chief
Administrative Law Judge (from the SEC's Office of Administrative Law Judges). See id.
§ 200.14(a).
175 See generally, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(4)-(6), 78o-4(c)(2)-(5), 78o-5(c)(1)-(2), 78q-
1(c)(3)-(4), 78u-2, 78u-3.
176 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.360(a)-(b), 200.14(a)(8), 200.30-9.
177 See id. § 201.360(c).
178 See id. § 201.410; see also id. § 201.411; 15 U.S.C. § 78d-l(b).
179 17 C.F.R. § 200.63.
180 Id. The Canons of Ethics further state:
A [Commission] member should be guided in his decisions by a deep regard for
the integrity of the system of law which he administers. He should recall that he
is not a repository of arbitrary power, but is acting on behalf of the public under
the sanction of the law.
Id.
181 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.80, 201.140.
182 Approximately 14 civil actions and approximately 47 administrative proceedings
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the SEC does bring a few "SCUM" cases each year,' 3 usually it
elects to go to court, either because it is seeking emergency relief,
such as a TRO and a freeze of assets,184 or because the agency
wants to send a message to the industry.'85 In recent years the SEC
has focused, in particular, on boiler room operations and microcap
fraud,'86 excessive markups,'87 market manipulation,'88 and fraud in
connection with hot IPOs. 189 It has also increased the number of
enforcement actions against firms (in contrast to individual
brokers) and managers for failure to supervise."9
Many of the SEC's enforcement actions, particularly those
filed administratively, are resolved by settlement. In those
settlements, the defendants or respondents generally consent to
the entry of judicial or administrative orders without admitting or
denying the factual allegations made against them. 9' Thus, SEC
enforcement actions cannot fill the void created by the absence of
regular production of precedents that would be instructive in
private claims for broker misconduct. Moreover, an SEC
against broker-dealers alleging fraud against customers are initiated by the SEC each year.
These statistics are derived from examination of the SEC's Annual Reports from 1995-99.
See 1999 SEC ANNUAL REP. 140, tb.1; 1998 SEC ANNUAL REP. 118, tb.1; 1997 SEC
ANNUAL REP. 148, tb.1; 1996 SEC ANNUAL REP. 150, tb.1; 1.995 SEC ANNUAL REP. 100,
tb.1.
'83 See, e.g., SEC v. Wolf, Litig. Release No. 16,189, 1999 SEC LEXIS 1.211 (E.D.N.Y.
June 16, 1999) (misrepresentations, unauthorized purchases); SEC v. Welco Sec., Inc.,
Litig. Release No. 16,253, 1999 SEC LEXIS 1624 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 1999) (unsuitable
purchases).
184 See, e.g., SEC v. First Am. Reliance, Inc., Litig. Release No. 15,931, 1998 SEC
LEXIS 2166 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1998); SEC v. Cammarano, Litig. Release No. 15,967,1998
SEC LEXIS 2405 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 1998).
185 There are no published guidelines enumerating the factors the SEC considers in
deciding whether to institute an enforcement action against a broker administratively or in
court. In the cover letter transmitting the SEC's 1997 Annual Report, Arthur Levitt,
Chair, stated: "The Commission consistently brings high profile cases against entities and
individuals it regulates, sending a strong message to the industry that misconduct relating
to the sale of securities will not be tolerated." Cover letter, in 1997 SEC ANNUAL REP.
1'6 See, e.g., SEC v. Penna, Litig. Release No. 16,270, 1999 SEC LEXIS 1766 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 2, 1999); SEC v. HGI, Inc., Litig. Release No. 16,162, 1999 SEC LEXIS 1078
(S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1999); SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450 (2d Cir. 1996); SEC
v. Hasho, 784 F. Supp. 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
117 See, e.g., SEC v. Great Lakes Equities Co., [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 91 95,685 (E.D. Mich. 1990); SEC v. Feminella, 947 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
188 See, e.g., SEC v Monarch Funding Corp., 983 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
189 See, e.g., SEC v. Hughes Capital Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1080 (D.N.J. 1996); SEC v.
Milan Capital Group [2000-2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91 91,256
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8,2000).
190 "[T]he Commission is placing greater emphasis on firms and their managers,
increasing the number of cases alleging failure to supervise, and imposing stiffer
sanctions." SEC 1997 ANNUAL REP. 8. For a well-publicized example, see In re Olde
Discount Corp., Sec. Act Release No. 7577,1998 SEC LEXIS 1914 (Sept. 10, 1998).
191 See 1999 SEC ANNUAL REP. 3.
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enforcement action will necessarily only address the issue of the
broker's misconduct, and not the difficult issues typically raised in
a customer's complaint such as justifiable reliance and measures of
damages.
4. SRO Enforcement Actions
The SEA authorized the creation of SROs, including national
securities associations (such as the NASD) 92 and national
securities exchanges (such as the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE")),"3 and permitted their registration with the SEC if they
adopted rules designed to, inter alia, prevent fraudulent and
manipulative acts and practices, promote just and equitable
principles of trade, and protect investors. 94
NASD. Violation of NASD Rules may give rise to
enforcement actions by the NASD's regulatory arm, NASD
Regulation.' 95 NASD Regulation's Office of Hearing Officers
("OHO") administers these disciplinary proceedings and appoints
a Hearing Panel, led by a Hearing Officer, to conduct the
proceeding 96 and render a written decision. 97 The decisions,
192 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(a) (1994). The NASD is responsible for regulating the
NASDAQ stock market and the over-the-counter market. Virtually all broker-dealers are
members of the NASD.
'93 See id. § 78f. The NYSE is the largest national securities exchange. Other
exchanges include the American Stock Exchange, Boston Stock Exchange, Chicago Board
Options Exchange, Cincinnati Stock Exchange, Chicago Stock Exchange, Philadelphia
Stock Exchange, and the Pacific Stock Exchange.
194 See id. § 78o-3 (associations); id. § 78f (1994) (exchanges). The Exchange Act
mandates that SROs bring disciplinary proceedings against their members for violations of
their Rules, or the securities laws and regulations, and to impose disciplinary sanctions, as
long as such proceeding provides sufficient due process. See id. § 78o-3(h); id. § 78f(d).
195 NASD Regulation's Department of Enforcement is its investigative and
prosecutorial arm, which employs attorneys and examiners. See NASD Regulation,
Corporate Department and Contracts, available at http://www.nasdr.com/2211.htm (last
visited Jan. 16, 2002) (indicating that the corporate department formulates the national
enforcement policy and oversees the prosecution of disciplinary proceedings at both the
national and district levels). The NASD By-Laws provide that formal disciplinary actions
involving members and associated persons charged with violations of NASD Rules or
securities laws and regulations shall be resolved by disciplinary hearing proceedings.
NAT'L Assoc. OF SECURITIES DEALERS, NASD By-Laws, Art. XII, in NASD MANUAL
(CCH) (2001) [hereinafter NASD By-Laws].
196 See NASD By-Laws, supra note 195, at Art. XII; see also James E. Day, Ten Steps to
Understanding the New NASD Regulation Code of Procedures, 12 INSIGHTS 11, 13 (1998).
The OHO's Chief Hearing Officer appoints an NASD Hearing Officer, who is an attorney
employed by NASD Regulation, as the chair of the Hearing Panel (or Extended Hearing
Panel for complex cases). See NAT'L Assoc. OF SECURITIES DEALERS, NASD CODE OF
PROCEDURE § 9231(b)(1), in NASD MANUAL (CCH) (2001) [hereinafter NASD CODE
OF PROCEDURE]. The Chief Hearing Officer also appoints two other independent
panelists, in accordance with the criteria set forth in Rules 9230-9232. See id. at § 9231.
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authored by an attorney employed by NASDR, are published in
the Central Registration Depository.'98
The NASDR Code of Procedure also provides for review of
Hearing Officer decisions by the National Adjudicatory Council
["NAC"] (formerly the National Business Conduct Committee),
the entity appointed by NASDR's Board of Directors and
authorized to hear appeals from or review a disciplinary
proceeding.'99 Following the prescribed appellate process, the
NAC may affirm, dismiss, modify or reverse the decision of the
Hearing Panel.2 ° The NAC also must issue a written decision
setting forth any action it takes with the respect to the Hearing
Panel Decision. 21  NAC decisions are also published on the
NASDR web site.
NYSE. NYSE Rule 476 provides for the use of a Hearing
Panel, chaired by a hearing officer, in disciplinary proceedings
brought by its Division of Enforcement.202 Hearing Panel opinions
must be in writing and set forth the basis of the decision, including
the precise statute, regulation, or exchange rule violated, the
sanction imposed and the supporting reasons.0 3 The NYSE's
Board of Directors may review any decision of a Hearing Panel. 4
'97 See NASD CODE OF PROCEDURE, supra note 196, § 9268(a). The Exchange Act
mandates that any decision denying, barring or limiting the membership of a person in an
SRO "shall be supported by a statement setting forth the specific grounds on which the
denial, bar, or prohibition or limitation is based." 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(h)(2) (1994). The
Code requires that the Hearing Panel's written decision include (1) a description of the
origin of the disciplinary proceeding; (2) the specific statutory or rule provisions that were
alleged to have been violated; (3) findings of fact; (4) conclusions as to whether the
Respondent violated any provision alleged in the complaint; (5) a statement in support of
the disposition of the principal issues raised in the proceeding; and (6) a description of any
sanctions imposed NASD CODE OF PROCEDURE, supra note 196, at § 9268(b). NASD
By-Laws also require any determinations at NASD disciplinary hearings to be in writing
and to set forth the basis of the decision. NASD By-Laws, supra note 195, at Art. XII, §
2(d).
198 See NASD CODE OF PROCEDURE, supra note 196, § 9268(d). These decisions are
also made available to the public on the NASDR web site, although they may be
published in redacted form if they do not meet the criteria of NASD IM 8310-2. See
NASD Notice to Members 00-36, available at http://www.nasdr.com/pdf-text/0036ntm.txt
(last visited Jan. 15, 2002).
19' See NASDR By-Laws, Art. V, § 5.1, available at http://www.nasdr.com (last visited
Jan. 16, 2002); NASD CODE OF PROCEDURE, supra note 196, § 9300.
2x See NASD CODE OF PROCEDURE, supra note 196, § 9349(a).
201 See id. The NAC written decision must include the same elements required in the
Hearing Panel written decision. See id. § 9349(b).
202 See NYSE R. 476(b), available at http://www.nyse.com/regulationiregulation.html
(last visited Mar. 25, 2002); see also NYSE Const., Art. IX, § 2, available at
http://www.nyse.com/regulation/regulation.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2002).
203 See NYSE Rule 476(e), available at http://www.nyse.com/regulation/regulation.html
(last visited Mar. 25, 2002); 15 U.S.C. § 78f (d)(1) (1994).
204 See NYSE Const., Art. IX, § 6, available at http://www.nyse.com/regulation/
regulation.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2002).
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SEC Order Affirming SRO Discipline. Section 19(d) of the
SEA requires that any decision in an SRO disciplinary proceeding
imposing a "final disciplinary sanction" on the SRO member " be
subject to review by the appropriate regulatory agency for such
member."2°5 Thus, the losing party to an SRO Decision, including
the NAC and the NYSE, may appeal to the SEC.2°  In reviewing
the SRO action, the Commission must make a de novo
determination of the facts and the law, 207 but may modify or cancel
sanctions only if "excessive or oppressive. "208 SEC decisions are
then issued pursuant to SEC Rules of Practice, as discussed above.
These administrative law decisions emerging from SRO
enforcement functions allow for review of the law governing
brokers' responsibilities to their customers. Recent disciplinary
actions have developed the law applicable to claims of unsuitable
recommendations, churning, unauthorized trading, section 10(b)
violations, and supervisory liability of the firm.209
5. Judicial Review of SEC Order
SEC orders disciplining brokers for violations of federal
securities law and rules-whether originated by an SEC or SRO
enforcement action-may be appealed directly to the Circuit
Court of Appeals in which the party resides or the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals. 10 Findings of fact are upheld if
supported by substantial evidence, 21 and a sanctions order must be
upheld unless the order is a "gross abuse of discretion. 212
Since the SEC, like private parties, must establish scienter
when alleging a Rule 10b-5 violation,213 judicial review of SEC
enforcement actions provides an opportunity to examine this
2 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d). Sections 19(e) and (f) set forth procedures for such a review. Id.
§§ 78s(e)-(f).
m See 17 C.F.R. § 201.420 (1999). The Commission may also review such decisions on
its own initiative. Id. § 201.421.
207 See, e.g., Shultz v. SEC, 614 F.2d 561, 568 (7th Cir. 1979).
20 Krull v. SEC, 248 F.3d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78s(e)).
209 See, e.g., In the Matter of Canady, 69 SEC Docket 1158, 1999 WL 183600 (Apr. 5,
1999); In the Matter of Engelman, 59 SEC Docket 758, 1995 WL 315515 (May 18, 1995);
Dep't of Enforcement v. Kernweis, Disc. Pro. No. C02980024, 2000 WL 33299605
(NASDR Feb. 16, 2000).
210 See 15 U.S.C. § 77i; id. § 78y(l). This judicial review mechanism also helps to
remind Commission members to "preserve the sanctity of the laws administered by them."
17 C.F.R. § 200.64.
211 See 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(4); see also Isen v. SEC, 87 F.3d 1319 (9th Cir. 1996) (table).
212 See Isen, 87 F.3d at 1319; see also Rizek v. SEC, 215 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2000).
213 See SEC v. Aaron, 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
10232002]
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element.24  In contrast, a NASD violation does not require a
showing of scienter2 5  Therefore, judicial review of SRO
disciplinary orders, although illustrative of typical broker
misconduct, 216 does not provide the same opportunity for
explication of the standard of culpability critical to an investor in
establishing a fraud claim. Given judicial deference, there will
likely be little opportunity for judicial development of the law and
no opportunity to explore justifiable reliance.
6. SEC and SRO Rules
SEC Rules. Section 23 of the SEA provides the Commission
with its general rule-making authority.17 Under that provision, the
Commission, as well as certain other related regulatory agencies,
may "make such rules and regulations as may be necessary or
appropriate to implement the provisions of [the SEA] for which
they are responsible or for the execution of the functions vested in
them by [the SEA]. 218 This section also states that no provision of
the SEA "imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or
omitted in good faith in conformity with a rule, regulation or order
of the Commission," or other regulatory agency pursuant to this
rule-making authority. 9
SRO Rule Changes. The by-laws of the NASD authorize its
Board of Governors to "adopt such rules for the members and
214 For example, in Rizek, the broker appealed an SEC order that permanently barred
him from the securities industry and imposed a civil penalty because he churned the
accounts of five customers in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The broker did
not contest the factual findings, but asserted that the sanctions were unwarranted since he
lacked the requisite scienter for such a sanction-while his investment strategy may have
been wrong, he had a good faith belief in it. The court affirmed the SEC order, agreeing
with the SEC's conclusion that the broker's violation was egregious and that he acted with
scienter. See Rizek, 215 F.3d at 157.
215 See Holland v. SEC, 105 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 1997) (table). The broker was found to
have recommended unsuitable investments when 25 percent of an elderly woman's net
worth was placed in speculative securities. The court noted that both the NASD and the
SEC found that he acted in good faith. The dissenting judge noted that the finding of
good faith should mean that he had "reasonable grounds" for believing his
recommendations were suitable. See id.
216 See, e.g., Krull v. SEC, 248 F.3d 907 (9th Cir. 2001) (unsuitable switches in mutual
funds).
217 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1994). Particular sections of the SEA also provide rule-making
authority to the Commission to enforce the provisions of those sections. See, e.g., id. §
78j(b) (noting that Rule 10b-5 was promulgated pursuant to the SEC's authority in section
10(b) of the SEA, the antifraud provision, to prescribe rules and regulations "as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors").
218 Id. § 78w(a)(1).
219 Id.
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persons associated with members, and such amendments thereto
as it may, from time to time, deem necessary or appropriate. 220
Any rules or rule changes proposed by the NASD must be filed
with and approved by the SEC before becoming effective.21
Certain rule changes, such as those involving a "stated policy,
practice, or interpretation with respect to the meaning,
administration, or enforcement of an existing rule" of the SRO,
may become effective upon filing.222
These SEC and SRO rules, regulations and Policy Statements
provide the standards of conduct for all registered broker-dealers
and their associated members for conducting securities business
with customers. Courts uniformly reject private rights of action for
customers suing on the basis of violations of SRO disciplinary
rules? 3 At least one court, however, recently has refused to vacate
an arbitration award based on an SRO rule violation, concluding
that the well-settled law precluding private lawsuits in courts for
SRO rule violations does not preclude an award to a customer
suing in arbitration for damages solely based on SRO rule
violations. 24 Proof of violations of these Conduct Rules may
demonstrate to an arbitration panel that the broker-dealer
violated a duty of care it owed to a customer.225
m2 NASD By-Laws, supra note 195, at Art. XI, § 1; see also id. at Art. VII, § 1. The
Board of Governors also has the authority to adopt regulations, and issue orders,
resolutions, exemptions, interpretations, and directions, and make decisions "as it deems
necessary or appropriate." Id. at Art. VII, § 1(a)(iii).
221 See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1). Section 19(b) of the 1934 Act, as amended by the
Securities Reform Act of 1975, and SEC Rule 19b-4 set forth the complicated process by
which a proposed rule change by any SRO is filed and becomes effective. The process
includes publication of the proposal to the public, a period allowing commentary by the
public, and approval or disapproval by the SEC. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (1999).
222 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(A). The statutory definition of an SRO rule that is
encompassed by this procedure includes "stated policies, practices and interpretations" of
the SRO. Id. § 78c(a)(27).
22 See, e.g., In re VeriFone Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 865, 870 (9th Cir. 1993); Craighead v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485,493 (6th Cir. 1990).
224 See Freeman v. Arahill, No. 111119/01 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. Oct. 18, 2001).
225 For example, the NASD recently filed with the SEC a policy statement to provide its
members with guidance concerning their obligations under the NASD's suitability rule in
the on-line context. NASD Notice to Members 01-23, Online Suitability: Suitability Rule
and Online Communications (Apr. 2001), available at http://www.nasdr.com/pdf.text
/0123ntm.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2002). This policy statement reflects the regulatory
effort to define what constitutes a "recommendation" made by an on-line brokerage firm
and thus triggers suitability obligations. Id. Absent judicial pronouncement, this policy
statement takes on increased importance as customers and brokers struggle to understand
their legal obligations in an evolving area of the securities industry.
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7. State Enforcement Proceedings
Each of the fifty states has its own securities laws ("Blue Sky
Laws") containing provisions governing the conduct of broker-
dealers licensed to do business in the state. While recent federal
legislation has somewhat reduced the role of state regulation,226 the
SEA expressly provides that state securities laws can co-exist with
federal securities laws absent a direct conflict.227 Many state
securities laws impose registration, reporting and record-keeping
requirements on broker-dealers and may include antifraud and
anti-manipulation provisions.228 Pursuant to those various state
laws, state securities administrators may be empowered to bring
enforcement proceedings against broker-dealers, or issue opinions
or interpretations of state securities laws. 229
In sum, all of the sources described above, while varied,
legalistic and authoritative, do not directly address questions
arising out of a civil cause of action by a customer against a
broker-dealer or its registered representatives for misconduct
arising out of transactions in an account. It follows then that none
addresses complex questions unique to claims such as the
customer's duty to investigate the broker, the measure of damages
stemming from broker misconduct, and the customer's duty to
mitigate. Thus, these sources of law will not provide the necessary
guidance and legal development for issues arising in typical
securities arbitration claims. This is particularly troublesome in an
industry undergoing rapid change and evolution since McMahon.
Given the complexities, uncertainties, and lack of development in
the law, how prepared are the arbitrators to decide these issues?
226 See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(h) (1994
& Supp. 2002).
227 See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a).
228 See generally POSER, supra note 107, § 13.05.
229 We will not attempt to individually describe the varying laws, regulations, and
interpretations emerging from all 50 state securities commissions. The North American
Securities Administrators Association ("NASAA"), a professional organization of state
securities commissioners, maintains links on its website to each of its fifty member states'
securities administrators, and interested parties may consult these agencies for applicable
rules. See North American Securities Administrators Association, available at
http://www.nasaa.org (last visited Jan. 16,2002).
1026 [Vol. 23:3
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C. SRO Arbitrator Training230
NASD-DR recruits, screens, and trains arbitrators to serve on
its panels.2 1  The NASD-DR program seeks a "diverse pool of
knowledgeable and qualified arbitrators to help maintain its fair,
impartial and efficient system of dispute resolution." 232 In order to
qualify for the NASD-DR's roster of arbitrators, a candidate must
have five years of "business, professional, investing, or other
related experience"; 233 however, she need not be a lawyer or have
any legal training.234 Rather, NASD-DR's stated goal is "to recruit
arbitrators from diverse backgrounds, including educators,
accountants, medical professionals, and others, as well as lawyers
and securities professionals. ''235 The candidate must attend and
complete the NASD-DR's introductory securities arbitrator
training program to be eligible to serve on a case.236 The program
consists of review of a self-study manual and attendance at a day-
long on-site classroom course. At the end of the day, the
230 Both of the authors are arbitrators at the NASD-DR. Some of the information in
this section is derived from their experiences during the application and training process.
231 See NASD-DR Recruitment Brochure, available at http://www.nasdadr.com
/arbbrochurejhtm.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2002) [hereinafter NASD-DR Recruitment
Brochure]. The New York Stock Exchange's Arbitration Department similarly recruits
and screens applicants. See New York Stock Exchange, Arbitration, available at
http:www.nyse.com/regulation/regulation.htm-d (last visited Mar. 31, 2002). However, as
discussed above, because NASD-DR handles the overwhelming majority of securities
arbitrations, this article will focus on NASD-DR's recruitment practices.
232 Form Letter from Margaret Duzant, Neutral Relations Supervisor, NASD
Regulation, to Arbitrator Applicant (Apr. 1999) (on file with authors). See also NASD-
DR Recruitment Brochure, supra note 231.
233 NASD-DR Recruitment Brochure, supra note 231. However, applicants are
disqualified if they work for, or have worked for an SRO in the last year, or if they have a
spouse who is employed in the securities industry and they are not at all affiliated with the
industry. See id. On the application, candidates must provide a basic description of their
professional backgrounds so that, if approved, they can be classified as public or securities
industry arbitrators. See id. In addition, applicants must answer some basic screening
questions to ensure that they do not have a criminal or other disciplinary history. See id.
234 See The Neutral Comer, Summary of Reader Survey Results (Feb. 2001), available at
http://www.nasdadr.com/neutral comer/nc_0601f.asp (last visited Jan. 11, 2002).
According to an NASD-DR executive, approximately sixty percent of its roster of
arbitrators are non-attorneys. Id. (noting also that fifty-five percent of those responding
to an informal NASD-DR survey of readers of its publication, The Neutral Comer,
reported that they were non-attorneys).
235 Id.
236 In addition, the NYSE conducts its own arbitrator training programs. A newly-
accepted NYSE arbitrator can also satisfy the training requirement by attending an
arbitrator training program sponsored by another organization, subject to NYSE approval.
That training must include "instruction in ethical considerations for arbitrators, arbitrator
conduct and arbitrator procedures." Again, no instruction on substantive law is given. See
Form Letter from R. Clemente, NYSE Director of Arbitration, to new arbitrator (Feb. 15,
2001) (on file with authors),
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candidate must pass a written, multiple-choice examination."7
The training program strongly emphasizes process and
procedure over substantive law.238 To determine liability, NASD-
DR trains its arbitrators to follow four steps: participate in panel
deliberations, determine the facts of the case, apply the law to the
facts, and reach a decision.239 For the third crucial step, applying
the law, the NASD-DR instructs as follows: "As arbitrators, you
are not strictly bound by legal precedent or statutory law.
However, it's important that you not manifestly disregard the
law. 240  The NASD-DR lesson further explains that manifest
disregard of the law is a possible basis, in some jurisdictions, to
vacate an arbitration award.2 41 Finally, the lesson notes that "the
integrity of arbitration requires a degree of uniformity of result. If
the panel members made up their own laws, the process would
lose credibility." 42
Clearly NASD-DR wants to provide a fair, impartial, and
efficient hearing. As long as the arbitration panel provides such a
hearing, the resulting award is relatively safe from attack( i.e.,
motions to vacate). Virtually no training materials, written or oral,
are devoted to educating arbitrators about areas of substantive law
they may face in a typical customer dispute. In fact, the only
instructions we could locate regarding what the law is on a
particular subject concerned the typical claimant's burden of proof
(preponderance of evidence),243 the different measures of actual
damages, 44 and whether a claimant is entitled to punitive
237 See Form Letter from NASD Regulation to Accepted Arbitrator (Nov. 1999) (on
file with authors).
238 See, NASD REGULATION, INC., ARBITRATOR TRAINING PORTFOLIO 3-159 (1999)
[hereinafter ARBITRATOR TRAINING PORTFOLIO]. The program is divided into three
modules, which are entitled: Prepare to Conduct a Fair and Impartial Hearing (2.5 hours);
Conduct a Fair and Impartial Hearing (2.5 hours); and Decide the Outcome of the Case (2
hours). See id. The first two modules are largely devoted to subjects regarding the
arbitration process, such as avoiding conflicts of interest, making relevant disclosures,
avoiding the appearance of impropriety, managing the discovery process fairly, refraining
from ex parte communications, managing the behavior of the parties equitably, and
facilitating testimony. See id. The third module is divided into four lessons: determining
liability, determining awards, completing the appropriate documentation, and responding
to post-award requests. See id. at 163-236.
239 See id. at 165.
2 Id. at 172.
241 See id.
242 Id. NASD-DR also periodically offers a chairperson training program for
arbitrators to complete in order to be eligible to serve as chairpersons of a three-member
panel. See 2002 NASD Dispute Resolution Arbitrator Training Programs, available at
http://www.nasdadr.comtraining/atp-neast.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2002). In the authors'
experience, this program again focuses solely on matters of procedure and the role of the
chairperson in the arbitration, not substantive law.
243 See ARBITRATOR TRAINING PORTFOLIO, supra note 238, at 174.
244 See id. at 182-84.
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damages.45
D. SRO Published Materials
Other than the Code of Arbitration Procedure, NASD-DR
provides two other published sources of guidance to arbitrators to
use when conducting hearings. First, The Arbitrator's Manual,
published by SICA, was "designed to supplement and explain the
Uniform Code of Arbitration as developed by SICA."246 Similarly,
this manual provides guidance to an arbitrator regarding issues of
process and procedure, but does not discuss any substantive law.
The inside cover of the manual states: "Equity is justice in that it
goes beyond the written law. And it is equitable to prefer
arbitration to the law court, for the arbitrator keeps equity in view,
whereas the judge looks only to the law, and the reason why
arbitrators were appointed was that equity might prevail. 2 47
Second, NASD-DR publishes the Arbitrator's Reference
Guide.248 This guide provides checklists, scripts, and other useful
quick reference tools for arbitrators to consult on procedural
matters, but includes no instruction regarding substantive law.
Contrasting sharply with the quote on equity contained in the
manual referred to above, the guide contains the following
"disclaimer":
These materials are for training and instructional purposes only.
They are not intended to be determinative or exhaustive of any
issue of law or equity that you may encounter during an
arbitration proceeding. The law or procedures to be applied in
each case should be determined upon consideration of the facts
and law as presented by the parties or which may be applicable
to the case. If you have questions that are not addressed
effectively by the parties, you may wish to request briefs from
the parties on applicable law.49
These two published sources of guidance crystallize the
tension between law and equity in arbitration proceedings.
Arbitrators are expected to achieve an equitable resolution of the
dispute before them but they may not ignore the law. However,
245 See id. at 185.
246 SEC. INDUST. CONF. ON ARBITRATION, THE ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, Preface
(2001), available at http://www.nasdadr.com/sica-manual.asp (last visited Jan. 8, 2002).
247 Id. (quoting Domke on Aristotle).
248 NASD REGULATION, INC., ARBITRATOR'S REFERENCE GUIDE (2001), available at
http://www.nasdadr.com/pdftext/arb-ref-guide.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2002) [hereinafter
ARBITRATOR'S REFERENCE GUIDE].
249 Id. at 1.
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without ample training or legal briefing by the parties on each
relevant issue,250 how can the arbitrators know what the law is or
how to apply it?
IV. ARBITRATION AWARDS: Is THERE ACCOUNTABILITY?
As we have discussed, the Supreme Court in McMahon
assumed arbitrators would apply the law and that the "manifest
disregard" standard would provide sufficient judicial oversight to
ensure that they did. How can courts know whether the
arbitrators are applying the law or not? It has been argued that
arbitrators should be required to give reasons for their awards so
there will be a basis for judicial review.25' In this section we
demonstrate that there is no meaningful review of arbitration
awards to assure arbitrators are applying the law.
A. The Contents of An Award
It is well-settled that arbitrators are not required to include in
their award an opinion setting forth the factual and legal bases for
the panel's decisions regarding liability or damages.52 In fact, the
vast majority of securities arbitration awards do not include an
opinion. Indeed, industry participants loathe the possibility that a
panel would write an opinion, as contrary to the panel's ability and
mission.25 3
NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure Rule 10330 sets forth
the requirements for a complete award. It must contain the
following: the names of the parties; the names of counsel (or other
representatives); a summary of the issues; damages, interest and
other relief requested; damages, interest and other relief awarded;
a statement of any other important issues considered and resolved;
250 See id. at 8, $ K. NASD-DR instructs arbitrators to request legal briefs from the
parties in advance of the hearing only if they identify "unique legal issues." Id.
251 See David A. Lipton, Generating Precedent in Securities Industry Arbitration, 19
SEC. REG. L.J. 26,41-43 (1991).
252 See, e.g., Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 F.3d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 2000); Halligan v. Piper
Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998). However, some courts have considered the
lack of a reasoned award in deciding whether to grant a motion to vacate an award for
manifest disregard of the law. See Halligan, 148 F.3d at 204; Montes v. Shearson Lehman
Bros., 128 F.3d 1456,1462 n.8 (11th Cir. 1997).
253 See infra notes 337-39 and accompanying text (regarding SIA's objections to Koruga
Award). In addition, the securities industry fears that reasoned awards provide the "basis
for regulatory inquiry and action." Lipner, supra note 20, at 674.
1030 [Vol. 23:3
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names of the arbitrators; the date the claim was filed; the date the
award was rendered; the number and dates of hearing sessions; the
location of hearings and the signatures of concurring arbitrators.254
This list makes no mention of an opinion or other written basis for
the determination of liability or damages. In fact, the "Award
Information Sheet" that the NASD-DR staff asks the panel to
complete, which is later used used as a basis to draft the award,
contains no space for an opinion.255
Some parties to securities arbitration call for reasoned awards
to explain the panel's seemingly inexplicable decisions. 6
Proponents of reasoned awards argue that encouraging or even
forcing arbitrators to write opinions will decrease parties'
suspicion that the "decision was the product of emotion or viscera,
rather than reason. '257 As a result, the argument goes, parties will
be less likely to challenge the award in court and courts will be less
suspicious of the integrity of the award.2 8 However, as discussed
below, it is not entirely clear the presence of an opinion would
make it easier for a losing party-whose seemingly irrefutable
legal position was rejected by the panel-to prevail on a motion to
vacate.
B. "Manifest Disregard of the Law"
The Federal Arbitration Act ["FAA"] governs agreements to
arbitrate arising out of "transactions in commerce. "259 Therefore,
arbitrations between customers and their brokerage firms are
governed by the FAA, whether in federal or state court.260 While
the statutory bases for vacating an arbitration award listed in
section 10(b) of the FAA leave room for interpretation, none of
254 See NASD CODE 2002, supra note 72, § 10330(e); see also ARBITRATOR'S
TRAINING PORTFOLIO, supra note 238, at 202 (omitting mention of written opinions).
255 See ARBITRATOR'S REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 248, at 22-26. Alternatively, if
the staff member asks the panel to draft the award, the Guide provides a form "Shell
Award" for this purpose. See id. at 27-32. There is no section in this form designed to
accommodate an "opinion" or other legal discussion of the basis of the panel's
determinations. Id. at 28-32.
256 See Lipner, supra note 20, at 670-75.
251 Id. at 673.
258 See id.
259 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
260 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that section 2 of the
FAA is applicable in state and federal court); see also Smith Barney, Inc. v. Henry, 775
So.2d 722, 725 (Miss. 2001) (applying FAA to securities arbitration); Levine v. Advest,
Inc., 714 A.2d 649, 657 (Conn. 1998) (same); Salvano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 85 N.Y.2d 173, 180 (1995) (same); Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 81
N.Y.2d 623 (1993) (same).
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the stated grounds explicitly provides for a review of the merits.
Rather, the focus of the statutory concerns is improper conduct on
the part of the arbitrators.26
Most Courts of Appeal have adopted the judicially created 26 2
"manifest disregard of the law" standard as an additional ground
to vacate an award.263  However, manifest disregard is not
recognized by some state courts as a ground for vacatur, even in
arbitrations governed by the FAA.264 What happens when a
customer wants to argue that an award arising out of a federal
securities law claim should be vacated because the arbitrators
manifestly disregarded the law? It is well-settled that the FAA
does not provide an independent basis of jurisdiction in federal
court.265 Without a jurisdictional basis, such as diversity, the
customer cannot proceed in federal court, and thus will lose the
ability to invoke the federal judicially created doctrine of manifest
disregard of the law as a ground for the attack on the award. How
can this result be reconciled with the mandate in McMahon that
the arbitrators apply the law, at least with respect to federal
statutory claims?
The Second Circuit's recent decision in Greenberg v. Bear,
261 The language of the pertinent provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act is
sufficiently ambiguous that creative advocates can craft arguments that it permits review
on the merits. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) ("[T]he arbitrators were guilty of... any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced"); id. § 10(a)(4) (1994)
("[T]he arbitrators exceeded their powers .... "). Whatever this language means,
however, it is a strained interpretation to say that it authorizes courts to review the merits.
See IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Royal Alliance Assoc., Inc., 266 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2001), which
rejects just such an interpretation.
262 See supra notes 31, 36 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
creation of the "manifest disregard" standard in Wilko and its transformation in
McMahon). Moreover, in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 941-42
(1995), the Supreme Court, in dictum, approved the use of "manifest disregard" as a
ground for vacating an award.
263 See, e.g., Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1.460 (11th Cir.
1997) (collecting cases and acknowledging that, except for the Fifth Circuit, every other
Circuit "has expressly recognized that 'manifest disregard of the law' is an appropriate
reason to review and vacate an arbitration panel's decision"). However, some Circuits
interpret that standard extremely narrowly. See, e.g., George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany
& Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2001) (indicating that manifest disregard means only
that arbitrators' awards cannot direct the parties to violate the law and must adhere to the
legal principles specified in the parties' contract).
264 See, e.g., Byerly v. Kirkpatrick Pettis Smith Polian, Inc., 996 P.2d 771, 775 (Colo.
App. 2000); Salvano, 85 N.Y.2d at 795. The Salvano court did recognize that, under the
unique circumstances of that case, the arbitrators' actions constituted a "wholesale
abrogation of respondent's procedural and substantive rights" which could be
characterized as an "action exceeding the scope of the arbitrators' powers, and then
covered by the statutorily-enumerated grounds." Id.; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. §
7511(b)(1)(iii) (1998).
265 See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32
(1983).
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Stearns & Co.266 provides an answer. In Greenberg, an investor
moved to vacate an arbitration award that dismissed his federal
securities law claim under section 10(b) of the SEA against a
clearing broker. The district court denied the motion, finding no
manifest disregard.
On appeal, the Second Circuit first addressed the subject
matter jurisdiction of the district court. Recognizing the general
rule that the FAA does not confer subject matter jurisdiction for
purposes of a motion to vacate, the Court of Appeals held that
there is no federal question jurisdiction simply because the
underlying claim raises a federal question . 67 However, the Court
carved out an exception when disposition of the matter
"necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of
federal law."268 In so holding, the Court was mindful of the federal
interest identified by the Supreme Court in McMahon to ensure
that arbitrators interpret and apply federal statutory law.269
Because in this case the investor argued that the arbitrators
manifestly disregarded section 10(b) of the SEA, the Court found
sufficient jurisdiction.27 ° Under Greenberg, therefore, an investor
with an award based on a federal statutory claim may have the
award reviewed for manifest disregard, but that may not
necessarily be the case with an award based on a state law claim.
Even if an aggrieved party to an arbitration award can
establish jurisdiction in federal court, the courts have severely
limited the reach of the manifest disregard doctrine. This raises a
question as to whether the review is sufficient to accomplish its
purposes of vindicating statutory rights as set forth in McMahon.
The very limited scope of review under the "manifest
disregard" standard is illustrated in Merrill Lynch v. Bobker 71 In
that case the firm moved to vacate an award of damages to a
customer based on the firm's cancellation of a short sale that, in
the view of the firm and the SEC, would have violated Rule 10b-
4.272 The district court found that the arbitrators, in not enforcing
266 220 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2000).
267 See id. at 26.
268 Id. (citing Barbara v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1996))
(internal quotations omitted).
269 See id.
270 See id. at 27. The Court then went on to hold that the arbitrators did not manifestly
disregard the law and refused to vacate the award. See id. at 29.
271 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986).
272 Former Rule 10b-4, now Rule 14e-4, prohibits short tendering, i.e., a person
tendering securities he does not own in a tender offer. Bobker tendered all his shares and
also sold short. For a fuller discussion of the rule and the SEC's response to Bobker, see
Prohibited Transactions in Connection with Partial Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release
No. 28,660, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,703 (Nov. 30, 1990).
20021 1033
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the "net long" provision of the Rule, had manifestly disregarded it.
It was apparent from the record that the arbitrators had a skeptical
view of the policy behind the Rule, but the Second Circuit,
reversing the district court, noted that the arbitration panel was
aware of Rule 10b-4 and had devoted an entire hearing session to
it. For an award to be in manifest disregard, the governing law
must be "well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable, 273 and the
error must be "obvious and capable of being readily and instantly
perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an
arbitrator. '274 Given the complexities of securities laws and the
many variations of the facts that can lead to different legal
conclusions, it is a rare arbitration award that will be vacated
under this standard. 275
Two Circuits have applied the "manifest disregard" standard
to vacate arbitration awards in SRO proceedings, but not in
proceedings involving customer disputes with brokers. In Montes
v. Shearson Lehman Brothers,276 involving the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the arbitrators denied the employee's claim after
the brokerage firm's attorney explicitly urged the arbitrators not to
apply the law. Since the award noted the attorney's plea and did
not explicitly state that the arbitrators rejected this plea, the court
found this established "manifest disregard."
While Montes can readily be confined to its facts, Halligan v.
Piper Jaffray, Inc. 277 opens the door to a more expansive judicial
review under the "manifest disregard" standard. In an SRO
arbitration, a former employee of respondent brokerage firm
alleged he had been fired in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. The arbitrators found in favor of the firm,
despite what the Second Circuit characterized as "overwhelming"
evidence that the termination of the employee's employment had
been unlawful. 278 Because the parties had presented the applicable
law to the panel, and because the panel provided no reasons for its
decision, the court concluded it must have disregarded either the
law or the evidence, or both.279 While the court states it does not
require arbitrators to write opinions, its opinion implies that
arbitrators should provide an explanation for an award that might
otherwise appear to a court as "in manifest disregard."
On the other hand, there is substantial doubt whether Montes
273 Bobker, 808 F.2d at 934.
274 Id. at 933.
275 See Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231 (1986).
276 128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997).
277 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
278 Id. at 203.
279 See id. at 204.
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and Halligan have had any effect in judicial review of arbitration
awards involving customers' claims. In Dawahare v. Spencer,28 the
customer sought to vacate an award in his favor because the panel
awarded him substantially less than the loss to which his expert
witness had testified. The court rejected his arguments,
reaffirming the limited judicial review of arbitrators' awards---"an
arbitration decision 'must fly in the face of established legal
precedent' for us to find manifest disregard.""2 ' The court also
noted that if arbitrators choose not to give reasons, "it is all but
impossible to determine whether they acted with manifest
disregard for the law." '282 Finally, to accept the customer's
suggestion for a more extensive judicial review of arbitration
awards "would undermine the goal of the arbitration process: to
resolve disputes efficiently while avoiding extended litigation.""2 3
These opinions, taken together, suggest that as long as the
panel considers the legal arguments made by the parties, no matter
how far afield of the well-settled law the result apparently turns
out, a court will not vacate the award on the grounds that the
panel manifestly disregarded or ignored the law. This very limited
standard of review suits the Supreme Court's purposes in
McMahon. Since the premise is that sending these claims to
arbitration is merely moving them to another forum and not
dispensing with the law, at a minimum there must be lip service
paid to a judicial review of arbitration awards. However, it cannot
be more than lip service since that will destroy the perceived
advantages to arbitration.
V. WOULD INVESTORS FARE BETTER IN COURT?
Because arbitrators may be limited in their ability to apply the
law, the arbitration forums are more concerned with process than
substance, and the courts provide little opportunity for meaningful
review, investors might question whether they can get a "fair
shake" in arbitration.8 This, inevitably, raises the question:
280 210 F.3d 666 (6th Cir. 2000).
281 Id. at 669 (quoting Merrill Lynch v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418 (6th Cir. 1995)).
m Id.
283 Id. In a non-securities arbitration context, the Supreme Court recently said that an
arbitrator's "improvident, even silly" fact-finding is not grounds for a court's refusal to
enforce the award. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001).
284 One commentator has concluded that investors may very well be better off in
arbitration, at least with respect to federal statutory claims. See Marc I. Steinberg,
Securities Arbitration: Better for Investors Than the Courts?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1503
(1996).
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Compared to what?
As previously discussed, the law governing a broker's liability
to a customer for misconduct is complex, stemming from both
federal securities law and state common law and statutory law;285
the uncertainties attendant in any contemporary body of law are
further exacerbated by the privatization of the law. It is clear,
however, that the law presents many obstacles that the investor
must overcome in pursuing a judicial remedy against a broker-
dealer.
To survive a motion to dismiss, investor plaintiffs must first
comply with stringent pleading requirements. Prior to 1995,
federal courts, and the Second Circuit in particular, enforced with
vigor Rule 9(b)'s 286 requirement that plaintiffs plead fraud
allegations with specificity.287 Plaintiff must (a) allege facts to show
that "defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit
fraud," or (b) allege facts that "constitute strong circumstantial
evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.' 28 The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") codified
these stringent pleading requirements.2"9  To plead scienter,
plaintiff must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind. 2
90
Furthermore, since 1991 investors contemplating Rule 10b-5
claims must act quickly. The Supreme Court, in one of the most
significant post-McMahon judicial developments affecting private
claims, decided that the statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5 claims
should be one year from the date of discovery, but no more than
three years from the date of the purchase or sale,29' borrowing the
statute of limitations for express causes of action under Section
9(e) of the SEA. Prior to this decision, the prevailing view among
the Circuit courts was to borrow the statute of limitations for the
closest, analogous state claim, generally a longer time period than
section 9(e). As a result, investors may have no choice but to
pursue state law claims. 92
2 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
286 See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
287 See, e.g., Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442,444 (2d Cir. 1971).
288 Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994).
289 See Douglas M. Branson, Running the Gauntlet: A Description of the Arduous, and
Now Often Fatal, Journey for Plaintiffs in Federal Securities Law Actions, 65 U. CIN. L.
REV. 3 (1996).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1997).
291 See Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
292 Investors have the same problem in arbitration, as they must comply both with the
applicable statute of limitations as well as the SROs' six-year eligibility rule. NASD CODE
2002, supra note 72, § 10304.
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If the investor files his claim in a timely manner and survives a
motion to dismiss, he faces a risk that both federal and state claims
will be summarily dismissed, either for failure to state a claim or
on a motion for summary judgment. We have previously discussed
how the elements of fraud and deception prevent investors from
holding brokers liable for conduct that may be unethical,
unprofessional, or incompetent, yet not constitute fraud under
either federal or state law. 93
Moreover, today's "reasonable investors" are expected to
possess a certain level of understanding and sophistication to
withstand broker-dealer misconduct.2 94  According to the courts,
reasonable investors should understand, for example, the time-
value of money,295 diversification and risk,296 and the securities
industry's compensation structure.97  Investors should not
succumb to brokers' "puffery. '298  While courts sometimes
proclaim that the plaintiffs were not "widows and orphans" when
denying relief to investors they decide should have known better,299
courts can impose equally high standards for widows-holding that
one with a tenth grade education and no prior investment
experience should have read and understood the prospectus for a
limited partnership interest recommended by her broker."9
Additionally, brokers possess legal advantages because
generally investors' claims are based on oral assurances or
representations made by brokers, while the brokers are the
possessors of the written record. For example, a plaintiff must
establish justifiable reliance on a broker's misrepresentations or
293 See supra note 96 and accompanying text; see also McDonald v. Alan Bush
Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809 (11th Cir. 1989); O'Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 965 F.2d
893 (10th Cir. 1992) (awarding summary judgment for the defendant due to a lack of
scienter).
294 According to the courts, some information is "so basic that any investor could be
expected to know it." Zerman v. Ball, 735 F.2d 15, 21 (2d Cir. 1984) (assuming that the
investor is familiar with the nature of margin accounts).
295 See Levitin v. PaineWebber, Inc., 159 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that an
investor should know that cash or securities left with a broker may be used to earn interest
for the firm).
296 See Dodds v. Cigna Securities, Inc., 12 F.3d 346 (2d Cir. 1993).
297 See Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 946 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a
broker did not have to explain that the firm made a profit by charging a mark-up when he,
in response to an investor's question of why he was not charged commissions on his
purchases of bonds, replied that commissions were not charged on sales from inventory).
298 Bogart v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 98,733 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
299 Granite Partners, L.P. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 58 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1999);
see also Primavera Familienstifung v. Askin, 130 F. Supp. 2d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., Inc., 814 F.2d 798, 805 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding that investors
are not "neophytes").
0 Dodds, 12 F.3d 346 (2d Cir. 1993).
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CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
recommendations. The typical case involves oral assurances of
low or no risk when the investor is given documentation disclosing
the risk factors."1 Despite what is stated to be an intensely fact-
specific determination, 2 courts do not view sympathetically
investors who are told lies by their brokers, if, in the view of the
courts, they had enough information to expose the lie. 3
As discussed previously, Rule 10b-5 fraud requires
deception.3 4 So, for example, if the broker exercises his control
over the customer's account and engages in inappropriate trading
activity that is set forth on the customer's account statements, and
the broker has made no misstatements to the customer, the broker
has a plausible defense that he has not committed securities fraud.
Unauthorized trading is another example where brokers win
because of the paper record. Courts frequently find that investors
cannot prevail on unauthorized trading allegations when they
received confirmation slips or monthly statements indicating the
allegedly unauthorized transactions and did not take prompt
action to complain; this is expressed under the doctrines of laches,
waiver, ratification, or, more generally, the investors' lack of due
diligence. The broker may be able to assert this defense more
generally to other allegations of inappropriate trading activity,
such as suitability and churning.
A recent opinion involving a common complaint among
online investors further illustrates the difficulties. Many online
trading systems generate a "confirmation" in response to an
investor's attempt to cancel a previous buy order, even though the
buy order was not, in fact, cancelled.3"6 The district court dismissed
3Ol See, e.g., Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983). Another common
scenario involves oral representations made when a contract contains a merger or no-oral-
representations clause. See Margaret V. Sachs, Freedom of Contract: The Trojan Horse of
Rule lOb-5, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 879 (1994).
302 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
303 Summary judgment has been granted for defendants due to a lack of justifiable
reliance. See, e.g., Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1028
(4th Cir. 1997); McAnally v. Gildersleeve, 16 F.3d 1493 (8th Cir. 1994); Chance v. F.N.
Wolf, 36 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1994); Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., Inc., 814 F.2d 798 (1st
Cir. 1987). See also Independent Order of Foresters v. Donald, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc.,
157 F.3d 933 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that disclaimers and warnings in formal disclosure
documents precluded any reasonable reliance on any statements contained in other sales
literature).
304 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
305 See, e.g., Olson v. C.F.T.C., 1.9 F.3d 28 (9th Cir. 1994); Modern Settings, Inc. v.
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 936 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1991); Stephenson v. Paine Webber
Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 839 F.2d 1.095 (5th Cir. 1988); Brophy v. Redivo, 725 F.2d 1218 (9th
Cir. 1984).
306 For a fuller discussion, see Barbara Black, Securities Regulation in the Electronic
Age: Online Trading, Discount Broker's Responsibilities and Old Wine in New Bottles, 28
SEC. REG. L.J. 15, 28-29 (2000).
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MAKING IT UP AS THEY GO ALONG
a class action charging that these "confirmations" were misleading
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 307 The district court relied on
precedent that section 10(b)'s "in connection with" requirement
means that the misrepresentation must concern either the value of
the security purchased or sold, or the consideration received in
return. The court could also have found, consistent with precedent,
lack of scienter. The court dismissed plaintiffs' state law claims
without reaching the merits, but it is unlikely that plaintiffs would
fare any better in state court. Discount brokers' contracts typically
disclaim liability in this situation,0 8 and as discussed earlier,3 9
courts generally hold that discount brokers owe no obligations to
their customers beyond the contract.
With all of these difficulties in proof, it is not clear that an
investor would be better off in court, where a judge would strictly
apply pleading requirements and construe the elements of each
claim against the plaintiff. In many ways, it is counter-intuitive
that the brokers fought so hard to get investors' claims out of the
courts and into arbitration, since customers' complaints are
frequently stronger on the equities-hardship and betrayal-while
the brokers' defenses are stronger on the law. This point is
illustrated by the pleadings filed by the parties. Investors'
attorneys generally draft their statements of claim as a narrative,
to persuade the arbitrators that the broker violated the customer's
trust,310 while brokers' attorneys generally emphasize legal
defenses in their answer.
Brokers have also become adept at using the customer's
agreement to their greatest advantage. Hence, they resisted
suggestions to require the customer to initial separately the clause
in the contract mandating arbitration, "' presumably recognizing
that the requirement would in many instances slow down the
process of opening customer agreements and might even cause
37 See Hoffman v. TD Waterhouse Investor Services, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 289
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
308 See Black, supra note 306, at 28.
3 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
310 According to a respected practitioner, the difference between a successful and a
losing claim is establishing that the customer's trust in the broker was well-founded and
then violated. See DAVID E. ROBBINS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION PROCEDURE
MANUAL § 5-1 (4th ed. 2000).
311 Requiring initials or a signature in an agreement is common in consumer protection
regulation to call the signatory's attention to it. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-205 (1990). NASD-
Regulation rejected the authors' suggestion requiring the investor to sign or initial the
margin disclosure agreement as "overly burdensome for members to comply with" and
"not significantly [increasing] the informational value to the customer." Self-Regulatory
Organizations, Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Regarding Delivery
Requirement of a Margin Disclosure Statement to Non-Institutional Customers, Exchange
Act Release No. 44223, 66 Fed. Reg. 22,274 (Apr. 26, 2001).
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CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
some customer resistance to the lack of an alternative to
arbitration. Yet brokers are quick to cite contractual language
that limits their liability to customers.
VI. ARE ARBITRATORS MAKING LAW OR DISREGARDING IT?
While it seems that an investor may have difficulty prevailing
in court under the established law, arbitration panels, on more
than an occasional basis, are reaching decisions favorable to
investors even where the "law is clear" that there is no basis for
imposing liability on the broker. These results may be explained
by the arbitrators being swayed by the equities: innocent,
unsophisticated investors generate sympathy from arbitrators, in
the form of an award, for tragic, seemingly avoidable losses,
despite the well-established law that suggests no liability by the
broker. Three areas where this is happening are margin sellouts,
economic suicide, and liability of clearing brokers.
"Margin Sell Outs". One complaint that has received much
attention in the financial press lately is "margin sell out" or
"blowout." With the recent volatility in the stock market,
customers in increasing numbers have complained about brokers
selling securities in their accounts to meet margin calls, without
giving the customers an opportunity to provide additional
margin.312 A frequent complaint is that brokers no longer give
customers three days notice to meet a margin call as had been
their previous practice."3 The law, at least so far as the regulators
are concerned, is unequivocally on the side of the broker. The
regulators have stated on numerous occasions that the margin
regulations are designed to protect the brokers and the stock
markets from the consequences of excessive leverage. 14
312 See Rachel Witmer, SEC Says Suitability, Two Other Types of Complaints Against
Brokers on Rise, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) (Apr. 27, 2001) (indicating that the SEC reported
120 complaints on margin sellouts in the first quarter of 2001, in comparison with 67 in the
first quarter of 2000). Customer complaints filed at NASD-DR in the first quarter of 2001
rose fifteen percent over the first quarter of 2000, and margin calls and online trading
accounted for more than ten percent of the new caseload. See NASD Stats, in SECURITIES
ARBITRATION ALERT 2001-16 (Apr. 18, 2001).
313 See Witmer, supra note 312.
314 See Self-Regulatory Organizations Order, supra note 311, at 22,274. Most recently,
the release approving a NASD rule change requiring delivery of a margin disclosure
statement to customers discussed an increase in customers' complaints relating to margin
accounts. The release finds that customers are "mistaken" in their beliefs that they are
entitled to: notification of margin calls, extensions of time on margin calls, the right to
dictate which security or other asset is liquidated, and advance written notice of increases
in firms' maintenance margin requirements. Id.
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Accordingly, it has long been settled that a customer has no
private right of action for damages if the broker permits the
account to be out of compliance with the margin regulations."5 A
broker may sell the customer's securities whenever a customer's
account falls below the maintenance margin level and, because it is
necessary to act fast in volatile markets, he has no obligation to
provide notice before selling. Further, even if the broker does
provide notice, he may still go ahead and sell off the securities in
advance of the time set forth in the notice if market conditions
warrant. Liquidation of the account without notice cannot
constitute securities fraud under Rule 10b-5. While theoretically
there could be an enforceable agreement between the customer
and broker to give notice that would give rise to a breach of
contract claim, the written agreement typically gives the broker
broad discretion to sell off securities without notice. 6
Yet, notwithstanding the clarity of the law, investors in
increasing numbers are filing arbitration claims based on margin
sellouts, and arbitration panels are occasionally awarding
customers for damages in these cases."7 While we cannot know
why the arbitration panels decided in the investors' favor,
conversations among investors' attorneys suggest that certain fact
patterns may make a case a winner: where, for example, the
broker has made oral assurances that it would not liquidate
without notice; where the broker knows that the investor has
always met his margin calls when given notice; or where the
broker's actions in liquidating the account may seem precipitous or
otherwise unreasonable. 8
Economic Suicide. Recently, online traders have brought
claims against their brokers where their basic assertion is that the
315 See Bennett v. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 770 F.2d 308, 312 (2d Cir. 1985).
316 See, e.g., First Union Disc. Brokerage Serv., Inc. v. Milos, 997 F.2d 835 (11th Cir.
1993); Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971.) (involving the
liquidation of a margin account where no Rule 10b-5 fraud was found); Schenck v. Bear,
Steams & Co., 484 F. Supp. 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (concerning the liquidation of an account
in full compliance with a customer's agreement). The court in Conway v. Icahn & Co., 16
F.3d 504 (2d Cir. 1994), found that a broker has a fiduciary duty to provide a customer
with notice, but in that case there was no customer's agreement authorizing it. The clear
implication is that where there is an agreement authorizing liquidation, the customer has
no complaint. See id.
317 See Ruth Simon, Margin-Related Claims Seeking Arbitration Are on the Increase,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2000, at C1. Through August 2000, investors had filed 152 margin-
related arbitration claims with NASD-DR, up from 117 margin claims in all of 1999 and
just 44 a year earlier. See id.
318 See id. The article describes an instance where an arbitration panel awarded an
investor approximately $500,000 for liquidating the investor's account without notice. See
id. It appears that the investor's attorney emphasized that the broker knew the investor
had the funds to meet margin calls and had earlier that month met margin calls. Id.
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broker should have realized their purchases were unduly
speculative or otherwise unsuitable for them. While these cases
may raise difficult questions of what constitutes a
recommendation,319 in the absence of a recommendation, a
discount broker owes no duty to assure that the customer's
purchases are suitable.
Here again, arbitrators are occasionally awarding damages to
customers.121 In a much-publicized case,3 21 a medical student
alleged that he opened an online account, even though he did not
understand what trading on margin was, and proceeded to lose
more than $40,000 by trading Internet stocks on margin. He
appears to have asserted both that the broker had a duty to warn
or stop him and that the broker improperly liquidated his account.
While the investor recovered only part of his alleged losses-about
$22,000 (plus $17,500 in attorney's fees) out of a claim for $75,000
in compensatory damages and unspecified other relief of
$150,000-the case signals a willingness on the part of at least
some arbitrators to award damages to investors contrary to legal
precedent.
Liability of Clearing Brokers. Investors who have claims
against a defunct introducing broker may seek to impose liability
on the clearing broker on the grounds it should have known that
the introducing broker was engaged in illegal conduct. Here the
law is clear-in the absence of active participation in the
fraudulent conduct, a clearing broker owes no duty to the
customer to monitor the introducing broker's conduct or to warn
the customer of the introducing broker's illegal activity.322
Nevertheless, some arbitration panels are imposing liability on
clearing brokers. These awards are withstanding motions to
vacate, despite the clearing brokers' strong arguments that the
awards show "manifest disregard. 323
319 See NASD Notice to Members 01-23, supra note 225.
320 See Black, supra note 306, at 31-32.
321 See Rebecca Buckman, Student Awarded $40,000 from Firm in Trading Case, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 17,2000, at C16.
322 E.g., Antinoph v. Laverell Reynolds Sec., 703 F. Supp. 1185 (E.D. Pa. 1989), affd
without opinion, 911 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1990); Riggs v. Schappell, 939 F. Supp. 321 (D. N.J.
1996); In re Adler Coleman Clearing Corp., 198 B.R. 70 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996); Rivera v.
Clark Melvin Sec. Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 297 (D. P.R. 1999); In re Blech Sec. Litig., 928 F.
Supp. 1279 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
323 See, e.g., McDaniel v. Bear Steams & Co., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 762 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
17, 2002); Koruga v. Fiserv Correspondent Serv., Inc., No. 00-1415-MA, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2417 (D. Or. Feb. 7, 2001); RPR Clearing v. Glass, 1997 WL 460717 (S.D.N.Y. July
25, 1997). While noting that there was no case "directly on point" in holding a clearing
broker liable under the facts of the arbitration at issue, the Glass court found that there
was case law "that suggests the possibility of a duty," and this was sufficient to defeat the
motion to vacate. Id. at *2.
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MAKING IT UP AS THEY GO ALONG
The problem with these results is unpredictability. It may be
that the arbitrators, hearing the facts and the law, believed there
were facts that put this particular case within an existing exception
to the prevailing legal principle. It may be that the arbitrators
were simply moved by sympathy to award damages to the
claimant, in blatant disregard of the law. It may be that the
arbitrators decided this case on the facts before them, without any
consideration of the law. Is there any possibility of predictability
in securities arbitration?
VII. SHOULD ARBITRATION AWARDS
PROVIDE PREDICTABILITY?
Attorneys, by their training, search for predictability of results
and compile precedent for that purpose. Securities arbitration
attorneys are no different; arbitration awards are being collected
and even cited by practitioners as precedent in other arbitration
hearings, both to provide predictability of result and to contribute
to the development of the law. However, given the limits on the
arbitrators' ability to apply the law and the lack of meaningful
judicial review, arbitration awards should have no significance
except to decide the actual dispute before the arbitrators.24
The arbitrators in a dispute heard by an NASD Dispute
Resolution panel in Portland, Oregon wrote an award explaining
in great detail why they imposed liability on a clearing broker.325
While the panel's decision to provide an explanation may have
stemmed from a concern that otherwise the decision would appear
inexplicable and be subject to attack on a motion to vacate, it
forthrightly asserted they wished to encourage other arbitrators
to provide explanations for their awards and thus to create "a body
of meaningful precedents. 326 The award merits careful attention
to assess whether it is likely to, and whether it should, become the
mechanism for development of the law.
In Koruga, several former customers of a defunct brokerage
firm, Duke & Company ("Duke"), brought an arbitration against
the firm, its principals and the customers' individual brokers for
324 For efficiency arguments in support of these views, see Landes & Posner, supra note
86, at 238-39 (noting that private judges have little incentive to write opinions, and
therefore there is a danger of many inconsistent precedents). The article suggests that
rule-making could be committed to a public body and dispute resolution to private judges,
although this may result in an inefficient system. See id. at 240.
325 See In re Arbitration between Koruga and Wang, No. 98-04276 (Sept. 28, 2000)
[hereinafter Koruga Award] (on file with authors).
326 Id. at 15.
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losses sustained in their securities accounts due to the
Respondents' alleged fraud.327  Claimants also named as a
respondent Duke's clearing firm, Hanifen Imhoff (now known as
Fiserv Correspondent Services), seeking to impose joint and
several liability on the clearing firm under state securities laws for
the misconduct of Duke and its principals .32  Respondents
vigorously argued that the applicable well-settled laws precluded
the imposition of liability on a clearing firm for the conduct of its
introducing broker.329
After a five day hearing, the arbitrators issued a thirty-nine-
page Award, which included extensive "Findings of Fact, '330 a
three paragraph section entitled "Conclusions of Law, '33' and a
twenty-five-page "Explanation of Award" explaining the factual
and legal bases for its decision. 32 The Panel awarded $1.7 million
in damages to the customer-claimants, finding that, under the
Washington and California securities acts, the clearing firm
"materially aided" the fraud of Duke and its principals. Crucial
findings of the Panel included the legal conclusion that Hannifen
Imhoff was a "broker-dealer" within the meaning of pertinent
state securities laws and that it "materially aided in the
transactions" between Duke and the claimants. 33
Significantly, as part of the Award, the Panel expressed its
view that, due to the McMahon decision upholding mandatory
arbitration, the law has not been sufficiently developed in the area
of broker/dealer liability to customers.334 The Panel also expressed
concern that, because arbitration awards do not include
327 Duke & Company was an alleged boiler room that encountered severe regulatory
problems in 1999 when a grand jury in New York County indicted the firm, its executives
and principals, and numerous employee/brokers for Enterprise Corruption under New
York State's penal law. The indictment alleged, inter alia, that the firm and its individual
employees engaged in securities fraud and theft from customers through stock
manipulation and a "pump and dump" scheme. New York vs. Duke & Co. Inc.,
Indictment No. 3325/99 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.) (filing date unavailable) (on file with authors).
By the time the customers filed the arbitration, Duke was already involved in a SIPC
liquidation proceeding and had no assets to satisfy customer claims. See Koruga Award,
supra note 325, at 6.
328 The claimants were residents of either Washington or California. Therefore, those
state's Uniform Securities Acts applied to the dispute. Under those Acts, the relevant
provisions of which were substantively similar, a "broker-dealer" who "materially aids" in
the challenged transaction is jointly and severally liable to the same extent as the primary
violator. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.430(3) (West 2002); CAL. CORP. CODE §
25504 (West 2001).
329 See Koruga Award, supra note 325.
330 Id. at 8-11.
3-1 Id. at 11.
332 Id. at 13-37.
3-3 Id. at 16-37.
334 See id. at 13.
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explanations for the decisions, prior awards concerning liability of
clearing firms had no precedential value because they contained
no reasoning."' As a result, the Panel announced that it was
including an explanation of its Award to "encourage future NASD
panels to be more forthcoming, so that a body of meaningful
precedents... may become available." '336
Subsequently, Hannifen Imhoff moved to vacate the award in
the United States District Court for the District of Oregon on the
grounds of manifest disregard of the law. The SIA filed an amicus
curiae brief in support of the motion.337 In its brief, the SIA argued
that the arbitrators "explicitly rejected" well-settled federal and
state law that clearing brokers have limited "operational or
ministerial" functions and thus are not liable to customers under
the securities laws (which require a party to provide "material" aid
to be liable).338 The SIA also argued that the arbitrators exceeded
the scope of their authority and "trespassed upon the domain of
the judiciary" by trying to create a body of meaningful precedents
and make law for other arbitration panels to follow.33
The district court denied the motion to vacate, ruling that the
arbitrators did not manifestly disregard the law.34° The district
court first re-stated the applicable Ninth Circuit standard that a
"reviewing court should not concern itself with the 'correctness' of
an arbitration award.""3 ' Instead, "[t]o vacate an arbitration award
on the basis of a manifest disregard of the law, it must be clear
from the record that the arbitrators recognized the applicable law,
and then ignored it."'342 According to the district court, the Award
demonstrated that the panel considered at length the applicable
law as the parties presented it and came to a reasoned decision as
335 See id. at 14-15.
336 Id. at 15-16 (emphasis in original). Even more troubling was the Panel's
announcement that, because it considered the regulatory response to "wide-spread micro-
cap fraud" to be "pathetically minimal," it felt responsible to provide "a careful and
thoughtful application of state securities laws to specific cases" to "produce tangible
results in reining in the continuing recycling of micro-cap fraud enterprises." Id. at 23.
337 Amicus Curiae Securities Industry Association's Memorandum of Law in Support of
Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award, No. 00-1415 MA (D. Or. Dec. 8, 2000) at 2. In that
brief, the SIA recognized its "institutional commitment" to the arbitration process and
thus did not undertake a request to vacate an arbitration award "lightly," but claimed "the
detrimental effects that will ensue if the Award is allowed to stand necessitate[d]" its filing
the brief. Id.
338 Id. at 3-27.
339 Id. at 27-30.
340 See Koruga v.*Fiserv Correspondent Serv., Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Or. 2001).
341 See id. at 1247 (citing Thompson v. Tega-Rand Int'l, 740 F.2d 762, 763 (9th Cir.
1984)).
342 See id. (citing Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 826, 832 (9th
Cir. 1995)).
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to how to apply that law.343 Claimants filed an appeal, which is
now pending.
The Koruga Award demonstrates what happens when a panel
painstakingly writes an opinion explaining the factual and legal
basis of its award. Despite industry concern that the panel
misapplied existing law or made new law,344 the award was immune
from vacatur because the arbitrators protected themselves by
reasoning through the law and writing out such reasoning
explicitly. As a result, whatever the ruling, no reviewing court
could say that the panel manifestly disregarded the law.
This Award further highlights the difficulty with tasking
arbitrators, many of whom are not lawyers and have little training
in the law, to produce reasoned awards. Arbitrators do not have
the resources available to judges, primarily law libraries and law
clerks, to craft reasoned opinions, and most arbitrators simply do
not have the time or judicial temperament to craft reasoned
opinions. The traits the NASD-DR looks for in arbitrators3 5 are
by no means the traits one expects a judge to possess. In this case,
significantly, the panel had to rely on the parties to supply them
with the relevant provisions of the law, and the panel apparently
had no way to verify independently that the law provided to them
was complete.
Moreover, despite the panel's views to the contrary,
arbitration awards have no value as precedent for future
arbitrations.3 46  Accordingly, there appears to be little reason to
write such an award, particularly if the end result is an award
immune from challenge no matter how the panel ruled. It is
neither realistic nor desirable to expect a body of law to develop
through arbitrators' awards, even though, as is typical in the legal
business, tremendous effort is now going into the compilation3 47
and analysis of awards. Attorneys engage in this activity to glean
an understanding of the mental processes or predilections of the
potential arbitrators selected for their panels, and for this purpose
343 See id. at 1248. The district court did not mention the SIA's amicus brief or the
arguments contained in it.
344 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Striking a Blow for the Little Guy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
11, 2001, at § 3, 1.
345 See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
346 See, e.g., El Dorado Technical Serv., Inc. v. Union Gen., 961 F.2d 317, 321 (1st Cir.
1992); see also David L. Heinemann, Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 1986 DUKE L.J. 548, 553-54.
347 See Securities Arbitration Awards To Be Available Online as of June 1, SEC. LAW
DAILY. (BNA), May 11, 2001. Signaling the importance of compiling these awards for the
arbitration process, the NASD-DR just entered into a formal arrangement with the
Securities Arbitration Commentator to make prior securities arbitration awards available
online and for no fee through a link on its website.
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it may serve some utility. To the extent arbitrators' awards are
reviewed for purposes of discerning development of the law, the
efforts seem misguided.
CONCLUSION
The law still maintains a starring role in securities arbitration.
It provides parties with guidance as to how to conduct themselves
in securities business and offers arbitrators standards of conduct
the parties are reasonably expected to follow. Under McMahon,
arbitrators are required to apply the law, at least with respect to
investors' rights under the federal securities laws. As for state law,
to the extent certain states do not require their arbitrators to
follow state law, this does not conflict with the Supreme Court's
mandate in McMahon.
It is premature to assess whether the law governing the
responsibilities of broker-dealers to their customers will remain
frozen following the McMahon decision. While the relative
scarcity of judicial opinions since McMahon might slow down the
evolution of the law or place disproportionate importance on the
opinions that are written, judges are still visiting these issues across
the country.
Meanwhile, arbitrators-limited in their ability to understand
and apply the law-are trained to grant paramount consideration
to questions of fairness and equity. As a result, if arbitrators want
to resolve a customer dispute in an area where the law is not clear
or well-developed, or even overly complex, they may draw on their
individualized notions of fairness rather than apply an outdated
legal doctrine to a modern transaction. Yet, arbitrators are barely
held accountable to any court of law for such decisions. Given the
current slant of the law disfavoring investors, however, this
consequence may actually create opportunities-albeit
unpredictable ones-for recovery of customer losses where none
existed before.
In that respect, arbitration may not be a "crapshoot" after all.
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